Kais Saied’s Governance: A Precarious Turn Towards Authoritarianism in Tunisia

Kais Saied’s Policies and Practices May Lead to an Explosion in Tunisia

Tunisia has experienced a disquieting authoritarian regression over the last few years following promising beginnings as a young democracy after the January 2011 revolution. Under President Kais Saied’s rule, old themes of stifling the opposition and punishing dissidents have become the norm and many Tunisians fear a return to the iron grip of former President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime. Tunisia’s once-vibrant political scene has been obliterated as Saied’s regime goes after journalists and other media professionals and authorities intensify their crackdown on fundamental freedoms. In a major blow to its integrity, Tunisia’s electoral commission recently approved only two new candidates to challenge Saied in the October 6 presidential election, opening itself to accusations of neutralizing any competition as Saied positions himself to win. Although under his new regime the economy remains in intensive care and international benevolence is disappearing, there is no effective opposition. Saied’s popularity remains high as he draws on his populist, xenophobic playbook to stoke public anger toward post-revolutionary politics.

This situation bodes poorly for the Tunisian human rights and democracy landscape, which is deteriorating dramatically in a context of tense relations with Europe (especially over migration) and a slow pivot away from Tunisia’s traditional western orientation in favor of partnerships with Russia, China, and Iran. Western countries need to rethink their approach to Tunisia’s democratic backsliding and champion human rights and accountability more assertively to ensure that the country remains squarely in the democratic corner. But without more robust internal opposition to Saied’s often outrageous actions, the international community has no choice but to pressure the regime to deliver on the president’s claim to restore democracy to the people.

Tunisia’s Political Climate Has Dramatically Changed Since 2021

Since July 25, 2021, when President Saied invoked a controversial interpretation of the constitution in order to assume full control of the state, Tunisia has undergone a drastic autocratic turn. Saied has rammed through a hyper-presidential constitution, dissolved parliament, and undermined judicial independence. The president, who had promised to put the 2010-2011 revolution back on track at a time of deep disaffection with the post-Ben Ali transition, rapidly dismantled many democratic institutions in an effort to impose his vision of bottom-up democracy that he said originates from the popular will. Though Saied’s near-total consolidation of power effectively nullified ten years of democratic gains, his power grab was cheered and welcomed by segments of society who believed he would re-establish justice and the rule of law. Saied promised to defend the poor and go after the corrupt; he has indeed bolstered his legitimacy through a campaign allegedly conducted against corruption. As the so-called people’s champion, he was lauded for punishing “corrupt and wealthy” businessmen deemed to be part of the elite who, according to the official narrative, had plundered the country.

Cybercrime decrees have provided an excuse for the arrest and imprisonment of journalists and activists.

As Tunisia approaches its first presidential election since Saied’s 2021 coup, repression has significantly intensified against dissidents. A main target has been the opposition Ennahda Party, a major force in the country’s erstwhile democratic transition whose leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has been in prison for about a year. Saied also drastically limited freedom of expression with Decree 54 on cybercrime against the spreading of rumors and fake news. Issued in September 2022, this draconian degree has provided an excuse for the arrest, detention, and imprisonment of more than 60 journalists, lawyers, and activists accused of conspiring with foreign powers. Authorities also have threatened civil society activists by seeking to revise Decree 88 of 2011, which guarantees freedom of association. The recent arrest of veteran human rights activist Sihem Bensedrine, ex-president of Tunisia’s post-revolution Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD), for conspiracy against the state’s security is just one example. In addition, prominent journalists Borhen Bsaies and Mourad Zeghidi were recently sentenced to a year in prison for vaguely defined speech offenses. And the list of would-be presidential candidates whom the Saied regime has incarcerated, exiled, or prosecuted is long, suggesting a fixed presidential contest.

While much of the population remains preoccupied with survival in deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the political opposition is in disarray and unable to counter the government’s suppressive practices. With the exception of the main opposition coalition the National Salvation Front—consisting of Ennahda members and independent politicians who took an early stance against Saied’s coup—politicians and activists have not stood firmly against Saied. To be sure, limited dissent has sometimes emerged. For example, the May 2024 partial government reshuffle that came at the height of Saied’s repression of civil society was met with protests. But more forceful opposition has not materialized and public opinion polls continue to suggest that, despite some concern about Saied’s actions, he retains significant public support.

Courting Russia, China, and Iran

Saied’s modus operandi has been to scapegoat others for the country’s difficulties, to fearmonger, and to propagate conspiracy theories. He repeatedly asserts that the country’s problems are the result of a conspiracy against him and the state. His anti-migrant rhetoric—portraying the flow of migrants as a criminal arrangement by pro-democracy forces with support from foreign enemies to change the country’s demography—has sought to deflect responsibility for the economic crisis and incited widespread violence against migrants and asylum seekers. This xenophobia has also contributed to Saied’s opposition to a $1.9 billion bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which could help ease Tunisia’s economic crisis. But accepting the funds would require Saied to carry out controversial reforms, such as the restructuring of more than 100 failed state-owned companies, that he has denounced as foreign interference (“diktats”).

As western financial support dwindles, Saied has more vigorously courted China, Russia, and Iran. Unconfirmed reports of Russian aircraft landing on Djerba island, perhaps connected to Russia’s role in Libya and the Sahel, suggest that Tunisia has become a focus of Moscow’s interest. These reports, along with the expansion of Tunisian-Russian trade, including record levels of oil imports, point to Tunisia’s shift in outlook. At the same time, Tunisia and China recently announced the signing of a strategic partnership during Saied’s May 2024 state visit to Beijing, the first by a Tunisian president in decades and a trip that cemented a perceived denigration of western influence. Similarly, Saied’s participation the same month in the Tehran funeral of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was scarcely in line with Tunisia’s traditional diplomacy, considering that the last such visit to Iran took place in 1965.

Saied’s stance has left him with few western allies, despite Tunisia’s long economic links to Europe and military ties with the United States. Western capitals have been at a loss as to how to respond and to signal their dissatisfaction, especially in the face of Saied’s vociferous accusations of foreign interference. The war in Gaza has played into Saied’s hands, as he has used it to deepen anti-western sentiment among the heavily pro-Palestinian public. Europeans in particular have remained pragmatically engaged with Saied, hoping that Tunisia’s political tide will eventually change, but such a stance may not be tenable.

The IMF Could Offer a Way Out, but Saied is Resisting

Amidst its authoritarian drift, Tunisia has faced an economic downturn that is likely to worsen without the loans and confidence provided by the IMF. The country’s bureaucratization and public sector spending have skyrocketed since the 2011 revolution, with much spending going for food and fuel subsidies at the expense of private sector development and social services. The further deceleration of growth amid the Ukraine war has also driven up inflation and foreign debt, which is now around 90 percent of GDP. As a result, credit agencies have downgraded Tunisia’s country’s ratings, making access to foreign financing even more difficult.

Saied has not been able to resolve the country’s economic problems or provide a semblance of political stability.

Though he sees himself as a man of solutions, Saied has not been able to resolve the country’s economic problems or provide a semblance of political stability. An IMF deal would undoubtedly help restructure the economy, but the spending cuts required by it would also knock off balance any government that tries to push them through, especially one as centralized as Kais Saied’s. The powerful labor union or UGTT—the single political and social force with enough power to thwart Saied’s project and which mobilized recently against his crackdown—would have much to lose from proposed cuts and public sector reforms that would disproportionally affect its membership. Meanwhile, Saied has chosen to deflect blame for the country’s woes onto Sub-Saharan migrants fleeing north from conflict. But the reality is that unless the economy rebounds and exports and tourism pick up, Tunisia’s default may be imminent.

With IMF talks long stalled, the possibility that the government may default has rattled the international community. Turmoil will be inevitable when state salaries that the government can no longer afford—representing 15 percent of GDP—plummet and imports, on which the country depends and whose costs exceed 50 percent of GDP, become even more expensive. Still, Saied may refuse an IMF deal and risk a default, drawing on foreign reserves, selling state assets, or turning to other potential revenue sources such as remittances or support from “friendly” governments such as Algeria. No matter what, economic hardship is likely to worsen, potentially drawing people to the streets and exacerbating the socio-economic and financial crisis.

Despite Tunisia’s gloomy economic and political outlook, western donors and the international community have acted schizophrenically. While decrying Tunisia’s autocratic turn, they have nurtured their security relationship with Saied’s government, a stance that has not facilitated democratization. The European Union has remained mostly silent in an effort to gain Saeid’s cooperation to curb irregular migration and sought to link financial assistance to controlling migrant flows but without ensuring compliance with human rights, especially growing abuses against migrants. With the threat of Tunisia’s economic and social decline, the international community needs to insist on improving governance, make its support contingent on a return to the rule of law, and encourage Tunisian authorities to remain committed to an IMF process.

The Tunisian Public and Tunisia’s Uncertain Future

While the upcoming election may be stage-managed and the victory of Kais Saied may be certain, the country’s future is not. A second Saied term heralds an intensification of his new autocratic mode of governance and a continued delay in implementing much-needed economic reforms. It is unclear if worsening political and economic conditions will finally cause at least some of Saied’s supporters to decide they have had enough.

The international community’s engagement with Tunisia should focus on helping Tunisians to restore democratic institutions and processes, especially in the context of the government’s slow turn away from the West. Part of the western approach should condition an IMF bailout on political reforms, including relaunching a political dialogue with all parties and finding some compromise on a pathway to democracy. This could pressure Saied to reverse direction. Still, Tunisians’ profound disillusionment with their country’s thwarted democratic transition will remain a challenge as Saied’s regime deepens its authoritarian policies and practices.

BY: PATRICIA KARAM

Featured image credit: Facebook/Tunisian Presidency