Turkish defence companies are increasingly seeking a new route into Europe’s expanding defence market: not through Turkey’s formal admission into EU defence schemes, but through acquisitions, joint ventures, local production and technology partnerships inside EU member states.
The latest example is Otokar. The Koç Group company has passed a critical stage in its Romanian expansion after announcing that Romania’s Competition Authority approved its acquisition of Automecanica S.A. Otokar said in its public disclosure that the approval had been granted, while other closing conditions under the share purchase agreement were still being completed.
The deal is closely connected to Otokar’s major COBRA II armoured vehicle programme in Romania. Otokar signed an agreement on April 29, 2026 to acquire 96.77 percent of Automecanica for approximately €85 million. The Romanian company’s Mediaș facility is central to Otokar’s local production plan, with the site covering around 140,000 square meters, employing more than 250 workers and technical staff, and holding infrastructure and licences required for NATO-standard serial armoured vehicle production.
The strategic background is the 2024 COBRA II contract. Otokar signed a €857 million agreement with C.N. Romtehnica S.A., acting on behalf of Romania’s Ministry of National Defence, to supply 1,059 COBRA II 4×4 tactical wheeled armoured vehicles. Under the contract, the first 278 vehicles were to be manufactured in Turkey, while the rest would be produced in Romania.
This makes the Automecanica acquisition more than a normal foreign investment. It moves Otokar from the position of a Turkish exporter into the position of a defence manufacturer with an industrial base inside the European Union. Otokar has said full assembly operations at the Mediaș facility are scheduled to begin in June 2026, and that the site will cover the full production cycle from metal cutting and welding to painting, assembly and quality testing.
The timing is important because Europe is entering a new phase of rearmament. The EU’s Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, scheme will provide up to €150 billion in long-maturity loans to member states for defence procurement and investment. SAFE is not money given directly to companies; it is financing for EU governments. But companies that produce inside EU member states are better placed to benefit from contracts financed through national procurement plans.
For Turkey, however, the problem is political as much as technical. Turkey is a NATO member with a large defence industry, but its access to EU defence financing tools remains contested. SAFE rules also require that procurement contracts ensure no more than 35 percent of component costs originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA states or Ukraine. For more advanced categories of defence procurement, contractors must also be able to modify equipment without non-EU restrictions.
This is where Otokar’s Romania move becomes strategically significant. A COBRA II produced, assembled, maintained and supported in Romania can be presented not simply as a Turkish export, but as part of Romania’s own defence-industrial capacity. That does not automatically open SAFE funds to Turkish companies, but it does create a European industrial channel through which a Turkish-origin platform can become embedded in an EU member state’s procurement ecosystem.
Turkey’s direct access to SAFE is mainly challenged by Greece and Cyprus. Greece’s objection is rooted in the Aegean dispute. In 1995, the Turkish parliament declared that if Greece extended its territorial waters beyond six nautical miles in the Aegean, this would be considered a casus belli, or cause for war. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has said Turkey must remove that threat if it wants Athens to consent to Ankara accessing EU defence funds such as SAFE. He also argued that the concerns of both Greece and Cyprus must be taken into account.
Cyprus has its own objection. Nicosia argues that Turkey should not gain access to SAFE because Turkey has no defence or security agreement with the EU and continues to support a two-state solution for Cyprus. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides has said that if Ankara insists on a two-state settlement, Turkey cannot move closer to the EU.
From Ankara’s perspective, these objections turn bilateral disputes into barriers against Turkey’s participation in Europe’s wider defence architecture. Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler has argued that Turkey has advanced capabilities in drones, air defence, naval systems, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare, radar, ammunition and rockets, and that Europe needs more cooperation with Turkey as defence spending rises. He also criticized restrictions that keep most SAFE-related spending inside the EU, EEA or Ukraine, saying they risk excluding Turkey from Europe’s security future.
This is why Turkish defence firms are increasingly turning to an industrial workaround. If Turkey as a state is blocked politically, companies such as Otokar, Baykar and Nurol Makina can still enter Europe through EU-based subsidiaries, acquisitions, co-production agreements and technology partnerships. The route is not “Turkey joins SAFE”; it is “Turkish firms become part of EU member states’ defence-industrial base.”
Baykar, Turkey’s leading drone manufacturer, is following a similar path. In June 2025, Baykar and Italy’s Leonardo established a 50-50 joint venture called LBA Systems. The company is legally and operationally based in Italy and is focused on the design, development, production and maintenance of unmanned aerial systems.
Baykar also completed the acquisition of Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace in June 2025 after receiving “Golden Power” approval from the Italian Prime Minister’s Office. Piaggio’s facilities are expected to serve as a European hub for the P.180 Avanti Evo and Baykar’s unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
The company’s latest European move came through France. On May 12, 2026, Safran and Baykar announced a strategic partnership to co-develop integrated solutions combining optronic sensors, navigation systems and guided weapon capabilities for drones and air-to-ground missions. Under the agreement, Baykar’s TB2 drones are expected to be equipped with Safran’s Euroflir electro-optical system, strengthening surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance capabilities.
These deals show that Baykar is no longer positioning itself only as a Turkish drone exporter. Through Italy and France, it is integrating itself into European aerospace, sensor and defence supply chains. That gives Baykar a stronger European identity and makes its platforms more acceptable for future European procurement environments.
Nurol Makina offers another example on the land-systems side. In March 2026, the Turkish armoured vehicle producer signed a deal to co-produce around 800 Gidran 4×4 vehicles in Hungary, based on its Ejder Yalçın platform. The deal moved Nurol from being a direct supplier to becoming a local European manufacturer, with production planned in Hungary and some components sourced from the broader EU defence supply chain.
Together, these cases reveal a broader Turkish defence strategy. Otokar is moving through Romania. Baykar is moving through Italy and France. Nurol Makina is moving through Hungary. The common pattern is local production, acquisition of European assets, joint ventures with EU companies, and integration into European supply chains.
This does not mean Turkish firms have found a guaranteed shortcut into SAFE or other EU defence funds. EU rules on local content, control, security guarantees, intellectual property, design authority and non-EU dependency remain serious obstacles. Greece and Cyprus can still oppose Turkey’s formal participation in EU defence schemes.
But company-level integration changes the battlefield. It is easier for Greece and Cyprus to oppose Turkey as a state than to block a Romanian armoured vehicle programme, an Italian drone joint venture, a French sensor partnership or a Hungarian co-production line. Once Turkish firms are embedded inside EU member states’ defence industries, the political argument becomes more complicated.
For Ankara, this is an industrial answer to a political problem. For Europe, it creates a new reality: Turkish defence companies may remain controversial at the state level, but they are increasingly becoming part of Europe’s own rearmament process.
In short, Turkish defence firms are not waiting for Turkey to be formally accepted into Europe’s defence architecture. They are building themselves into it from the inside — through factories, subsidiaries, acquisitions, joint ventures and technology partnerships.
By: GEOPOLIST – Istanbul Center for Geopolitics
