Bangladesh’s Political Upheaval: Accidental Revolutionaries End Sheikh Hasina’s Reign

How did a student-led protest movement result in the collapse of Bangladesh’s government?

Macdonald: The Hasina government’s precipitous fall is a testament to its egregiously poor handling of the protest movement and her overall legacy of increasingly autocratic response to political dissent. Despite the government’s decision to appeal the quota verdict — effectively siding with the students — the prime minister demeaned the protest movement and her party sanctioned its student wing’s violence against protesters. When clashes between the police, ruling party supporters and protesters turned deadly, the government refused to take steps toward substantive accountability. The protester’s dissent and the subsequent repressive government response are emblematic of Hasina’s long rule, one that featured little space for political opposition and increasingly illiberal governance.

At various points, the government had options to placate the protesters, but chose defiance and to crackdown instead, resulting in at least 300 deaths. The Awami League (AL) appeared unable to grasp the long-standing deeper grievances that the movement represented. The government’s rhetoric and actions unleashed Bangladesh’s most potent and irrepressible political force: its university students. Over the weekend, the government declared another nationwide curfew after the police and ruling party’s student wing members killed dozens more protesters. After standing by the government during weeks of protests, the army balked, refusing to enforce the curfew with violence. With the police already overrun, Hasina had no choice but to flee.

What happens now?

Macdonald: Despite initial scenes of jubilation in the streets, Bangladesh is entering a dangerous and uncertain period that presents a series of challenges.

The first challenge will be preventing violence. Early news reports after Hasina’s fall indicate public deep-seated rage against the former ruling party, with reports of former AL ministers’ homes and businesses being attacked, pro-government TV stations and other symbols of AL power lit aflame, and members of the Hindu minority — historically supporters of the AL — being targeted.

In the next days and weeks, Bangladesh is likely to convulse in further retributive violence against AL members, party supporters, religious minorities and state officials who abused their authority, particularly law enforcement. With the police now boycotting duty and widely unpopular, the army will need to play a key role in preventing chaos.

The second challenge will be forming an inclusive and credible interim government. The composition of the interim government and who leads it will shape its legitimacy and its stabilizing effect. The prime minister’s resignation was the only demand that unified the anti-government protest movement. With that achieved, divisions will now emerge. Some student leaders have rejected an army-backed administration and are proposing names for an interim government, including Nobel Peace Prize winner and Grameen Bank founder Mohammad Yunus as chief advisor.

The army might have its own ideas on the final list. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), and other opposition parties will try to shape the direction of the movement, but many students and young people reject these parties as well. The BNP itself is riven with latent factions and rivalries that will likely surface without the AL as a unifying adversary. Finally, prominent civil society figures will jockey for influence. Bangladesh’s much larger neighbors, India and China, will also seek to influence the outcome in their own favor. Given these competing groups, there is a danger that the interim government ultimately excludes the very youth voices who drove this revolution.

The third challenge will be balancing the need for institutional reform with holding new elections. Bangladesh’s political institutions have atrophied. The election commission, police, judiciary and other key institutions lack public trust given their perceived collaboration with Hasina’s long rule. The caretaker government system that undergirded past peaceful transitions of power no longer exists. Moreover, the AL’s sudden departure leaves a gaping hole in the country’s politics that many new, reform-minded actors do not yet have the organizational capacity to fill.

What does this mean for Bangladesh’s relationships with key international actors?

Macdonald: Bangladesh’s domestic tumult is likely to draw significant attention from the region’s geopolitical competitors. Hasina’s fall impacts India the most. India has key interests in trade, infrastructure connectivity and security in Bangladesh, with which it shares a long border. Delhi has invested heavily in its alliance with the AL, consistently defending it against international criticism. For India, the political opposition parties — specifically the BNP and JI — are unacceptable alternatives (and potentially close to Pakistan), which led India to stand by Hasina despite roiling protests.

The BNP has historically been hostile toward Indian influence in Bangladesh and recently embraced an “India Out” social media movement after January’s parliamentary elections. If the BNP emerges as Bangladesh’s next ruling party, it will likely shift the country’s approach to India. However, the economic importance of Bangladesh’s biggest neighbor will likely prevent dramatic changes to its foreign policy. India has made strategic and structural investments in Bangladesh that make it difficult for any future government to turn away from India.

The AL’s collapse resets Bangladesh’s politics, but it is unclear what direction the new path will lead. Bangladesh has strong undercurrents of political violence, illiberalism and extremism that could rise during a period of prolonged political instability. But the country also has an untapped reserve of civic and political talent among young people, activists, artists and intellectuals who were stifled during the AL’s dominance.

The United States can encourage dialogue between democratic stakeholders and support international and domestic non-governmental organizations to help Bangladesh’s next generation of leaders develop the skills needed to shape their country’s future. Additionally, the United States remains popular among Bangladesh’s citizens and newly ascendant political class, which creates the potential to forge strong ties with whatever government comes next. The challenge will be to find a path forward that safeguards the democratic ideals that youth protesters seek but also promotes stability that is necessary for Bangladesh’s continued economic and political development.