Middle East Leaders Lean Towards Trump, Prefer His Diplomatic Style and Predictability

Donald J. Trump’s candidacy seems to draw more interest and support from the Middle East than from other areas of the world, particularly from among the ruling elite in influential countries like Israel and in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Saudi support for Trump may not be surprising given that current US President Joe Biden was sharply critical of Riyadh during his 2020 presidential election campaign, slights that the Saudi leadership has not forgotten. But Joe Biden’s low poll numbers in Israel are indeed a surprise given his tight embrace of the country following the October 7 Hamas attack and his substantial support for Israel’s ongoing campaign in the Gaza Strip. The Democratic Party, especially its progressive wing, has become much more critical of Israel than the Republicans, and any Democratic nominee who will replace Biden—such as Vice President Kamala Harris—is not likely to change this dynamic and may even wind up boosting Trump’s standing there.

Other states in the region, such as Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may also be more supportive of Trump than a Democratic nominee but are keeping their cards close to their chests. Their support derives at least partly from an expectation that as in Trump’s 2017-2021 presidency, a second Trump administration would pay little attention to sensitive issues like human rights. They also believe that Trump, with his unusual style of diplomacy, may be able to end the war in Gaza—something that the Biden administration has not been able to do.

Cultivating the Saudis

The Saudis undoubtedly remember with nostalgia that Trump chose their country as the first foreign state he visited as president. They did have misgivings about him during the 2016 campaign when he railed against immigrants from Muslim majority countries and then banned their entry to the United States soon after taking office. But Saudis received Trump’s May 2017 speech in Riyadh well, as he assured them and other assembled leaders of Arab and Muslim countries that he would not pressure them to democratize. He stated,

Our partnerships will advance security through stability, not through radical disruption. We will make decisions based on real-world outcomes – not inflexible ideology… And, wherever possible, we will seek gradual reforms – not sudden intervention. We must seek partners, not perfection—and to make allies of all who share our goals.

Trump also touted the substantial economic links between Saudi Arabia and the United States. He emphasized that he had just signed “historic agreements with the Kingdom that will invest almost $400 billion in our two countries and create many thousands of jobs in America and Saudi Arabia,” although much of this amount was part of previous deals.

Trump continued this transactional foreign policy when he hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) in the White House in March 2018. In front of cameras, Trump displayed a large chart that supposedly showed Saudi purchases of US military items as if business and diplomacy were essentially the same thing. In addition, MBS
cultivated a friendship with Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, whom Trump put in charge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Saudi Arabia did not formally endorse Trump’s so called “peace plan” for Israel and the Palestinians (which heavily favored the former), or the later Abraham Accords, in which Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the UAE established diplomatic relations with Israel. But it is believed that MBS approved Bahrain’s decision to join the Accords.

Trump played a crucial role in trying to protect MBS in the wake of the gruesome murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi.

For his part, Trump played a crucial role in trying to protect MBS in the wake of the gruesome murder of Saudi dissident and US resident Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Although the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that MBS was responsible for ordering the murder, Trump made equivocal public statements about the crown prince’s role. Trump also supported the Saudi role in the Yemen war, restoring US munitions that had been held up by the Obama administration and vetoing legislation that aimed to end US support for the Saudi military campaign.

That Trump did not hide his belief that he would likely run again in 2024 may have influenced MBS’s position to override the doubts of Saudi investment experts in 2021 and place $2 billion of Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth in a new investment firm started by Kushner, who lacked experience in running such a venture. MBS is clearly banking (literally and figuratively) on a new Trump administration. In March 2024, with Republican Senator Lindsey Graham acting as conduit, Trump and MBS held a very friendly phone call with Trump reportedly touting his poll numbers to the de-facto Saudi leader.

Biden’s Pullout from the Race Will Not Alter the Saudi View

Although at the moment it appears clear that Biden’s replacement as Democratic nominee will be Vice President Harris, the Saudis will still likely prefer Trump. When Biden made the comment during his 2020 campaign that he would treat Saudi Arabia as a “pariah,” he did not get any pushback from his fellow Democrats (including Harris). Indeed, when Biden decided to visit Saudi Arabia in 2022—largely to try to persuade the Saudis to produce more oil to address the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on energy prices—he felt compelled to publish an op-ed in the Washington Post to justify his visit. Speaking largely to his fellow Democrats, he said, “I know that there are many who disagree with my decision to travel to Saudi Arabia. My views on human rights are clear and long-standing…” He also reminded his readers that his administration “reversed the blank-check policy we inherited,” citing his release of the intelligence community’s report on the Khashoggi murder, sanctions on the Saudi unit involved in his killing, and visa bans on Saudi officials involved in harassing Saudi dissidents abroad.

The irony of these statements is that after the visit, the Biden administration immediately placed the Saudi human rights issue on the back burner. Although the Biden team was critical of many of Trump’s policies, it hoped to build on the Abraham Accords as a way of achieving a diplomatic ‘win’ in the Middle East, especially after the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan. In addition, with Israeli-Palestinian peace-making frozen, the administration hoped that inducing the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords would be a game-changer. However, this prospect became more complicated as the Saudis reportedly demanded a NATO-like security pact with Washington and US support for a Saudi civilian nuclear program as the price for normalizing relations with Israel.

The Biden team hoped to build on the Abraham Accords as a way of achieving a diplomatic ‘win’ in the Middle East

The war in Gaza has further complicated US-Saudi relations, as the Biden administration has tried to enlist Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in a post-war reconstruction plan that would entail billions of dollars on their part. But until the war ends and the Israelis agree to return Gaza to Palestinian control (which they have refused to do), Riyadh and other Gulf capitals remain reticent. Saudi officials today may be happier with the Biden team than they once were, given its numerous visits to the kingdom in recent months, but they still seem more comfortable with Trump.

In addition to the Saudis’ large investment gift to Kushner, the Trump family has been busy securing large business deals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Trump’s son Eric recently told the Financial Times that not only will the Trump organization be involved in developing a Trump tower in Jeddah, it will also partner with the Saudi real estate firm Dar Global in building a luxury resort and golf course in Oman. Already, the Trump organization operates a luxury golf course in Dubai in the UAE. Eric Trump implied that these deals were not a conflict of interest because “I don’t really deal with foreign governments,” but this practice of mixing business with government is not new for Trump, nor for the Gulf states. The group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington reported that from December 2016 (soon after Trump was elected) to February 2017, Saudi lobbyists paid for about 500 rooms, worth $270,000, at Trump’s Washington, DC hotel, and that when MBS visited New York in 2018, his entourage stayed at the Trump International Hotel in Manhattan, spiking the venue’s revenue by 13 percent. As for the UAE, it spent up to $10,000 per night for rooms at the Trump Washington, DC hotel from late 2017 to mid-2018.

Trump Still Popular in Israel

During his presidency, Trump became very popular in Israel for his many gifts to the government. These included recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the US Embassy to that city, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights, closing the US Consulate General in Jerusalem that mainly served the Palestinian community, and closing the PLO office in Washington. Trump’s moves were so well received in Israel—even outside of right-wing factions—that during his 2019 election campaign Netanyahu produced giant billboards of Trump and him smiling together. But when Netanyahu congratulated Biden for winning the 2020 US presidential race, Trump took umbrage, and his relations with Netanyahu soured.

As is known, days after October 7, Biden flew to Israel where he not only embraced its leaders and met with relatives of the Hamas hostages, but even met with the Israeli war cabinet, reflecting his longstanding and deep Zionist beliefs. These acts as well as his advocacy for more military assistance to Israel, which Congress eventually passed, initially boosted Biden’s standing in Israel. As the war in Gaza dragged on, however, and Palestinian civilian deaths mounted, Biden became more critical of Israel’s military campaign, calling it “over the top,” and he pressed Israel to allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza. These comments, and the short hold-up of 500-pound bombs to Israel (2,000 pound bombs are still under review), may have helped to turn many Israelis against Biden, which was evident in a May poll in Israel that found that 43 percent of Israelis supported Trump and just 32 percent backed Biden.

Trump’s moves were so well received in Israel that Netanyahu produced giant billboards of Trump and him smiling together.

Far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir called on Netanyahu not to approve a Gaza cease-fire/hostage deal because he did not want to give Biden a win prior to the US election. Although Biden’s July 21 announcement that he would not run again has made this argument moot, and Ben-Gvir was criticized by Netanyahu’s Likud party for suggesting it, indications are that Netanyahu prefers Trump and hopes to rekindle his close relationship with him. That Harris has exhibited a slightly different approach regarding the Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip only reinforces the notion that the Israeli leader is rooting for a Trump win.

Both Trump and his running mate, Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio, have opposed any restrictions on or criticisms of US support for Israel’s war in Gaza, though Trump has said that Israel needs to get the war against Hamas “over with fast.”

Other Countries in Silent Mode but Hoping for a Trump Win

Several Arab countries that have longstanding ties to the United States, namely Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain, have been more circumspect about the US presidential race, but are also likely quietly rooting for Trump. This is due in large part to the Democrats’ rare criticism of the human rights situation in Arab authoritarian states and to the punitive measures that Democratic administrations have sometimes imposed on such countries for their abuses of the opposition.

For example, during the 2020 campaign, Biden tweeted that there would be “no more blank checks for Trump’s favorite dictator,” Egypt’s ruler Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and once in office, he held up a portion ($130 million) of military aid to Cairo partly in response to US congressional pressure (largely coming from Democrats) over human rights. By contrast, Trump called Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi a “fantastic guy” in 2016 and later received him in the White House, which Biden has not done. But because the United States needs Cairo’s help to resolve the war in Gaza, the Biden administration has dropped its public criticism of Egypt, and Biden himself has held several phone calls with Sisi on the Gaza situation. Nonetheless, Sisi and his government probably yearn for another Trump administration where their repression would not come under scrutiny. Similarly, Bahrain, ever since the 2011 crackdown, has occasionally been criticized by Democratic administrations, whereas Trump, in his last full day as president in January 2021, bestowed the Legion of Merit, Degree Chief Commander, on Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. And under Democratic administrations, the UAE has been subjected to criticism over allegations of “facilitating Russian economic activity” and its role in the Yemen war, whereas the country seems to be a favorite of Trump and his family’s business.

The Arab leader who may miss Biden the most is Jordan’s King Abdullah, who has long had a friendly relationship with the US president. The Jordanian monarch believed Trump was overly indulgent of Netanyahu and opposed the Trump peace plan. If Trump were to win the presidency again, however, the king will try to reach an accommodation with him, as too much is at stake for Jordan if the Israeli-Palestinian situation remains unresolved.

Preferences, and a Waiting Period

Given the unpredictable nature of the 2024 presidential election, Middle East leaders would do well to hedge their bets and avoid throwing their lot in with Trump prematurely. Kamala Harris appears to have secured the support of a majority of Democratic delegates to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago next August and is expected to win the nomination. If she ends up winning the presidential race in November, these leaders will not only have to deal with a Democratic president who is close to Joe Biden and is likely to continue his policies, but also to work with America’s first female president. The next few months will obviously be pivotal for both Trump and Harris as they navigate the presidential campaign, but they also provide Middle East leaders with an opportunity to critically evaluate how the two may or may not help them serve their countries’ best national interests.