A new ceasefire and “phased integration” agreement announced on Friday, January 30, 2026 has been welcomed by a wide range of actors—from the government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa to Kurdish-led authorities in the northeast, and from regional stakeholders to Western diplomats—but it is already producing two sharply different readings of what “integration” will mean in practice.
The deal follows a turbulent month in which government forces pushed into areas that had been under Kurdish-led administration for more than a decade, shifting front lines across eastern Aleppo and deeper into the northeast. The January 30 announcement could signal a possible calm, but the same ambiguities that allowed for a ceasefire could also lead to new disputes during its implementation.
The immediate goal of this new agreement is to stabilize a ceasefire that had already been tested. An earlier 14-point ceasefire and “full integration” understanding was announced on January 18, and subsequent days saw renewed friction, then a time-limited truce that was extended. By January 27, officials were openly acknowledging that key details still needed to be nailed down in new talks, even as a ceasefire extension was set to run into early February.
What changed on January 30 was not simply the announcement of another truce, but the publication of a more operational ‘roadmap’—including how forces would move, which institutions would be absorbed, and what kind of military structure might emerge—while leaving the most politically sensitive questions sufficiently elastic for each side to claim it had protected core interests.
One text, two interpretations
Despite the common headline of “integration,” the core dispute is already visible in how each side describes the end state.
The January 30 framework presents a broad outline for a plan that envisions the withdrawal of front-line forces and the deployment of security personnel linked to the Interior Ministry in key urban centers of northeastern Syria. It suggests a gradual integration of Kurdish-established governing bodies into state institutions, while also addressing Kurdish civil rights, educational rights, language policy, and the repatriation of displaced individuals.
On the military side, the agreement indicates a structure that can be described in two different ways: either as the integration of recognizable SDF units into a new formation or as a step toward their eventual dissolution. According to some accounts circulating around the text, the deal points to the formation of a division that would incorporate three SDF brigades, while forces associated with Kobani would be organized as a separate brigade and tied into a division linked administratively to Aleppo.
In briefings, Kurdish officials argued that integration would proceed through recognizable brigade formations rather than simple dissolution, and they highlighted that new brigades would be formed with Kurdish commanders. The same messaging has stressed that local internal-security policing would remain in place and that any entry of central Interior Ministry units into major cities is meant to coordinate the transition rather than replace local structures.
Damascus, by contrast, has leaned hard into a sovereignty-first interpretation: no autonomy, no parallel security state, no permanent exceptions. In official language surrounding the deal, the central government has argued that institutions must ultimately fall under state authority and that the country cannot contain zones outside government control. This is where the most important textual nuance appears—one that directly clashes with the Kurdish-led narrative. While Kurdish officials highlight brigade structures, state media has stressed that even if former SDF members form brigades, their integration into the army would occur “on an individual basis” following security checks—a formulation widely read as dissolving the political meaning of units while absorbing personnel into the national system. In other words, while Kurdish brigades led by Kurdish commanders may exist, Damascus signals that it will treat the process as individual recruitment and vetting rather than recognizing a semi-autonomous force within the state.
It is precisely here—between unit-based incorporation and individual absorption—that the agreement’s meaning fractures.
Tension emerged almost immediately within the administrative sphere following the announcement of the January 30 agreement. On that day, Damascus appointed Brig. Gen. Marwan al-Ali as the internal security commander for Hasakah province, marking the first concrete administrative step after the deal. This appointment highlighted the potential for disputes over procedural matters, particularly regarding whether key positions should be negotiated with Kurdish authorities or directly issued by the central government.
Additionally, the agreement is closely linked to one of the most pressing security concerns in northeastern Syria: the detention facilities and displacement camps associated with the Islamic State. On January 30, Syria announced plans to close the al-Hol and Roj displacement camps within a year. Syrian forces have reportedly taken control of the al-Hol camp following the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while the SDF continues to maintain control over the Roj camp. Furthermore, the United States has been coordinating the transfer of ISIS detainees from Hasakah to Iraq, adding another layer of urgency to the issue of who controls and guards these prisons.
Why broad support is possible
Yet—at least publicly—this deal also appears to have unusually broad “buy-in.” Public reaction has been positive across multiple stakeholders, largely because the same text allows different actors to highlight different gains by interpreting it differently.
The administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa has welcomed the framework as progress toward restoring state authority across the country, presenting the entry of state security forces into key northeastern cities and the merger of institutions as steps toward unified governance.
Kurdish-led officials in the northeast have also welcomed the deal, emphasizing the ceasefire’s role in preventing renewed fighting and pointing to language on rights, education, and returns as a basis for safeguarding Kurdish interests during a phased transition.
Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Region’s leadership has also welcomed the announcement: Masrour Barzani publicly endorsed the agreement and expressed hope it would expand and help secure rights and returns, while Nechirvan Barzani was cited as offering similar support.
Western officials also welcomed the announcement. Tom Barrack called it a “historic milestone,” and French messaging has signaled support for implementation—reflecting an international priority to prevent a new major battle in the northeast and avoid a security vacuum.
Not a final settlement but everyone is “happy”
At the level of public messaging, it may seem that almost everyone is satisfied. The Sharaa administration can promote the idea of “unity and sovereignty.” The administration in Rojava can highlight “averted war and preserved local continuity.” The Barzani camp can advocate for “de-escalation and protection” as the ‘big brother’ of the Kurds in Syria and seek to expand their influence in the region. Meanwhile, Western officials can emphasize “a stabilized front and the avoidance of humanitarian and security breakdowns.”
The same feature that makes the deal broadly marketable—its ability to accommodate competing narratives—also renders it structurally fragile. The implementation of the January 30 agreement will be the true test, particularly because unresolved issues regarding authority, security governance, and the mechanics of integration can create friction as forces are deployed and appointments are made. Additionally, there are concerns about potential spoilers and the complexities involved in transforming a ceasefire into a lasting settlement.
Even with widespread support, the long-term success of the agreement will rely on reconciling the differing interpretations during its implementation. This deal serves as a foundation for peace; however, it is important to note that sensitive issues—such as the chain of command, policing authority in major cities, and the pace and method of administrative handovers—could still lead to renewed tensions if addressed unilaterally or without clear mechanisms in place.
For that reason, the deal is widely seen as a framework rather than a definitive settlement. In the Turkish proverb often used to describe negotiations that remain open-ended, “Bu hamur daha çok su kaldırır”—this dough can take more water—meaning the current arrangement may evolve again, and further agreements may be needed as realities on the ground change.
By: GEOPOLIST – Istanbul Center for Geopolitics
