By using this site, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Accept
Geopolist | Istanbul Center for GeopoliticsGeopolist | Istanbul Center for GeopoliticsGeopolist | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics
  • Home
  • Geopolitics
    Geopolitics
    Discover professional insights into international relations, regional conflicts, and global power dynamics by visiting Geopolist. Keep up on the ways in which these changes impact…
    Show More
    Top News
    Training, Reskilling, Upskilling: How to Create Jobs through the Green Transition
    April 13, 2025
    Don’t be fooled, push for normalization is about US dominance
    August 12, 2024
    Gulf Investments in China: A New Era of Strategic Partnerships
    August 11, 2024
    Latest News
    The Saudi-Israeli Blueprint: From Arab revolt, 9/11 to Assad’s Downfall
    May 3, 2025
    China Publicly Labels U.S. and Japanese Destroyers as Enemy Targets
    April 25, 2025
    The Fracturing Nuclear Order and the Uneasy Dawn of a Third Nuclear Age
    April 25, 2025
    Al-Sharaa: Syria Negotiating Future Military Presence with Russia and Turkey
    April 24, 2025
  • Security
    SecurityShow More
    The Fracturing Nuclear Order and the Uneasy Dawn of a Third Nuclear Age
    April 25, 2025
    Indonesia Eyes Partnership in Turkey’s KAAN Fighter Jet Program Amid Deepening Defense Ties
    April 14, 2025
    Turkey vs. Israel in a Hypothetical War: The Myths and the Realities
    April 10, 2025
    IAEA Raises Fresh Alarm on Global Nuclear Security Amid Rise in Radioactive Incidents
    March 2, 2025
    Turkey Successfully Tests Tayfun Ballistic Missile, Doubling Strike Range
    February 5, 2025
  • Commentary
    CommentaryShow More
    The Saudi-Israeli Blueprint: From Arab revolt, 9/11 to Assad’s Downfall
    April 30, 2025
    The Fracturing Nuclear Order and the Uneasy Dawn of a Third Nuclear Age
    April 25, 2025
    Collapse of Turkish Soft Power: Cyprus Recognition by Turkic States Reflects Post-Gülenist Vacuum
    April 17, 2025
    Turkey vs. Israel in a Hypothetical War: The Myths and the Realities
    April 10, 2025
    The West’s Pact with Power: How Erdoğan’s Autocracy Was Accepted and Normalized
    April 10, 2025
  • Economy
    • Energy
  • Regions
    • Europe
    • Middle East & Africa
    • Eurasia
  • Jobs
Reading: Reassessing Western Security Strategies in the Sahel: Lessons from Niger’s 2023 Coup
Share
Notification Show More
Font ResizerAa
Geopolist | Istanbul Center for GeopoliticsGeopolist | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics
Font ResizerAa
  • Home
  • Geopolitics
  • Security
  • Commentary
  • Economy
  • Regions
  • Jobs
  • Home
  • Geopolitics
  • Security
  • Commentary
  • Economy
    • Energy
  • Regions
    • Europe
    • Middle East & Africa
    • Eurasia
  • Jobs
Have an existing account? Sign In
Follow US
  • Advertise
© 2022 Foxiz News Network. Ruby Design Company. All Rights Reserved.
Geopolist | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics > Blog > Regions > Middle East & Africa > Reassessing Western Security Strategies in the Sahel: Lessons from Niger’s 2023 Coup
CommentaryGeopoliticsMiddle East & Africa

Reassessing Western Security Strategies in the Sahel: Lessons from Niger’s 2023 Coup

Last updated: September 22, 2024 1:55 am
By GEOPOLIST | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics Published September 22, 2024 3.7k Views 8 Min Read
Share
SHARE

The DIIS policy brief from September 2024 provides an in-depth analysis of the evolving security landscape in the Sahel, particularly focusing on Niger in the wake of the 2023 military coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. For over a decade, Niger had been a cornerstone of EU and US security efforts in the region, seen as a relatively stable partner compared to its neighbors, Mali and Burkina Faso, where French and international forces were facing increasing difficulties. The coup in Niger, however, forced a reevaluation of Western strategies, as the political and security landscape shifted rapidly with the new military junta assuming control and pursuing a different path in its foreign partnerships.

Before the coup, Niger’s strategic importance had only grown as other nations in the Sahel saw increasing instability and the withdrawal of foreign forces. With Mali and Burkina Faso distancing themselves from French and Western military support, Niger became the “last man standing” for the EU and US, who relied on the country for counterterrorism operations and broader security cooperation. Under Bazoum and his predecessor Mahamadou Issoufou, Niger had earned a reputation for its relatively competent military and willingness to engage in security training and cooperation with foreign partners. The perception of “Fortress Niger” was widespread among Western diplomats and security officials, who saw the country as a bulwark against the spread of Islamist extremism and instability in the region.

However, beneath the surface of this cooperative relationship, there were significant risks and tensions that Western partners either underestimated or misunderstood. The coup was driven by both immediate political concerns—General Abderrahmane Tchiani, the coup leader, feared scrutiny and removal amid anticorruption efforts—and deeper issues related to Niger’s military and political culture. Niger has a long history of military coups, and the army’s intervention in politics is seen by many within the military as part of their role in maintaining the stability of the republic. This belief, dating back decades, reflects a pervasive view that the military has the right to “regulate” civilian leadership when it is perceived as corrupt or ineffective.

One of the key findings of the policy brief is the disconnect between how Western actors viewed their relationship with Niger and how Nigérien officials, particularly within the military, perceived foreign involvement. Interviews conducted before and after the coup reveal that while Western diplomats and military officials were generally confident in their partnerships with Niger, local perspectives were more varied. Some Nigérien officers, especially those in senior ranks, valued the training and assistance provided by foreign partners like the US and France, but others were more skeptical. Junior officers and enlisted personnel, in particular, were prone to populist ideas that criticized Western military presence, often seeing it as a form of neocolonial interference. This mistrust was further fueled by rumors—though unsubstantiated—that French forces were acting independently of Niger’s military and might even be colluding with jihadist groups.

The rapid deterioration of Niger’s relationships with its Western partners following the coup was stark. The military junta, the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP), quickly severed ties with many of Niger’s previous security partners, including the US and France. French troops were ordered to leave within weeks, and by March 2024, after a failed diplomatic mission by high-ranking US officials, American forces were also on their way out. In place of Western assistance, Niger has begun to cultivate new partnerships, most notably with Russia. While Russian military involvement in Niger is not yet on the scale seen in Mali—where Russian mercenaries play a significant role—there are concerns that this shift signals a broader realignment of Niger’s foreign policy away from the West.

The policy brief also sheds light on the underlying reasons for the coup and the broader regional implications. Niger’s preference for bilateral security relationships rather than multilateral ones, as well as its relatively strong military and weak civilian institutions, created a fragile political balance. President Bazoum’s government was seen as competent by the international community, but internally there were signs of tension, particularly between Bazoum and his predecessor Issoufou. Some Nigérien observers believed that Issoufou was maneuvering behind the scenes to retain influence over the country’s politics, and these internal political struggles likely contributed to the instability that culminated in the coup.

The brief makes several recommendations for how the EU and US should adjust their security strategies in the Sahel in light of these developments. First, it emphasizes the need for building deeper, more resilient relationships with local security forces and governments. Trust is crucial, and Western partners must be able to maintain influence even when political circumstances change. This requires more than just training and equipment—it involves ongoing political engagement, a commitment to understanding local dynamics, and a willingness to adapt to new realities on the ground.

Second, the brief calls for more coherent and responsive security offers from Western actors. In the past, security assistance has sometimes been fragmented, with multiple countries and organizations providing overlapping or redundant support. Moving forward, the EU and US should focus on creating integrated, well-coordinated assistance programs that address the specific needs of local partners. This would help to avoid confusion and inefficiency, while also strengthening the overall impact of foreign assistance.

Finally, the brief highlights the importance of long-term planning and consistency in engagement. The situation in Niger underscores how quickly foreign partnerships can unravel when political instability strikes. Western actors need to be prepared for such eventualities by maintaining a consistent presence in the region, both in terms of resourcing and personnel. This long-term commitment would help to build stronger partnerships that can withstand the shocks of political upheaval, while also providing a platform for ongoing dialogue and cooperation.

In summary, the policy brief suggests that the West’s approach to security in the Sahel needs to evolve in response to the realities on the ground, particularly in light of the events in Niger. The rapid shift in Niger’s political landscape, and the corresponding change in its foreign partnerships, underscores the fragility of security cooperation in the region. Going forward, Western actors will need to adapt their strategies, focusing on building deeper relationships, creating coherent assistance programs, and maintaining long-term engagement to navigate the complex and shifting political environment in the Sahel.

Read more here: DIIS_PB_Sahel_Sept_2024-locked (1)

You Might Also Like

The Saudi-Israeli Blueprint: From Arab revolt, 9/11 to Assad’s Downfall

China Publicly Labels U.S. and Japanese Destroyers as Enemy Targets

The Fracturing Nuclear Order and the Uneasy Dawn of a Third Nuclear Age

Al-Sharaa: Syria Negotiating Future Military Presence with Russia and Turkey

Egypt Hosts China for Landmark Air Drills, Signaling Strategic Shift Amid U.S. Tensions

Share This Article
Facebook Twitter Email Print
Previous Article The Black Sea: A Geopolitical Hotspot and the EU’s Strategic Role
Next Article Shifting Alliances: The Impact of Ukraine’s War on Russia’s Regional Leadership in Eurasia
Leave a comment

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Stay Connected

TwitterFollow
YoutubeSubscribe

Latest News

Iraq Reclaims Strategic Spotlight as Regional Trade Routes Bypass Strait of Hormuz
Economy Energy Geopolitics Middle East & Africa
Collapse of Turkish Soft Power: Cyprus Recognition by Turkic States Reflects Post-Gülenist Vacuum
Commentary Eurasia Geopolitics
Offshore Pact, Mineral Finds Signal New Era for Pakistan
Economy Energy Geopolitics
Indonesia Eyes Partnership in Turkey’s KAAN Fighter Jet Program Amid Deepening Defense Ties
Defence Technology Geopolitics

Find Us on Socials

© GeoPolist. All Rights Reserved.
  • Submit an Op-Ed
  • Jobs
  • Post Jobs & Ads for Free
Welcome Back!

Sign in to your account

Lost your password?