On 24 February 2026, the Agartala-Dhaka-Kolkata international bus service, linking Indian states of Tripura and West Bengal via Bangladeshi territory, was resumed after remaining suspended for 18 months. Four days earlier, all Bangladeshi diplomatic missions in India resumed issuing visas of all categories to Indian citizens on a limited scale, with India reportedly contemplating doing the same. Meanwhile, some Indian media outlets are expressing cautiously optimistic view of a ‘reset’ in ties with Bangladesh under the newly elected government in Dhaka, while some other Indian media outlets are pushing anti-Bangladeshi narratives. For example, the Assam Tribune recently claimed that Bangladesh is involved in a conspiracy to send “illegal immigrants” to West Bengal ahead of the province’s Legislative Assembly elections. On 26 February, Indian law enforcement agencies initiated a major crackdown on alleged Bangladeshi “illegal immigrants” in Bengaluru. This demonstrates that the Indo–Bangladeshi relations are in a flux after the recently held parliamentary elections in Bangladesh.
Partial Compartmentalization: Indo–Bangladeshi Relations after the July Uprising
In the 21st century, the relationship between Russia and Turkey best exemplifies the notion of compartmentalization. Since the 2010s, Russia and Turkey have engaged in competition for influence, and in some instances, proxy wars in several theaters, including Syria, Libya, and Transcaucasia. Simultaneously, Russia served as the principal source of natural gas for Turkey, built a nuclear power plant in Turkey, and sold advanced air defense systems to it, while millions of Russian tourists continued to visit Turkey every year. Even now, Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplies it with weapons, and seeks to undermine Russian influence in South Caucasus and Central Asia, yet it continues to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, buys large quantities of oil and gas from Russia, and acts as a hub of key European Union-origin military goods for Russia. This is a classic example of compartmentalization of bilateral relations.
After the overthrow of the Bangladesh Awami League-led government, which was closely aligned with India, on 5 August 2024, an interim government took power in Bangladesh, and bilateral ties between Dhaka and New Delhi went downhill. Between 5 August 2024 and 12 February 2026, India undertook a number of actions against Bangladesh. New Delhi suspended most visa services for Bangladeshi citizens, withdrew non-essential staff and their families from Indian diplomatic missions in Bangladesh, cancelled transshipment facilities for Bangladesh, started forcibly pushing into Bangladesh so-called “illegal immigrants”, and refused to normalize ties with Dhaka pending elections. Moreover, Indian media outlets waged a sustainable information warfare campaign against Bangladesh, Indian politicians accused Bangladesh of conducting a ‘genocide’ against Hindus, Bangladeshi High Commission in New Delhi and Assistant High Commission in Agartala were attacked, and some Indian politicians and analysts called for genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Bangladeshis.
On its part, Bangladesh also undertook some actions against India, including the suspension of bus services to India, the cancellation of a $21 million defense deal, and the refusal to sign an energy deal with India’s H Energy. Moreover, Indian commentators viewed Bangladesh’s rapprochement with Pakistan, recalibration of ties with China, and defense procurement negotiations with Turkey negatively, and anti-Indian rhetoric became prevalent to a certain extent. Yet, Dhaka sought to avoid a complete rupture in bilateral relations, and it led to continued cooperation between Dhaka and New Delhi in some sectors. For instance, Bangladesh held a joint naval exercise with India in the Bay of Bengal in March 2025, continued to import diesel from India, and exchanged prisoners with its neighbour in January 2026. Also, Bangladesh carefully refrained from formally joining any anti-Indian bloc or alliance.
Thus, under the interim government, Indo–Bangladeshi relations underwent a process of partial compartmentalization. This means that bilateral issues were dealt with separately instead of collectively, leading to disputes on some issues and cooperation in others.
Towards Full Compartmentalization?
After the formation of a government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), both Indian and Bangladeshi officials have expressed optimism about the normalization of bilateral ties, and some steps, such as the invitation sent to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the inauguration of the BNP-led government, and the resumption of the India–Bangladesh bus service and visa services for Indians, have already been taken in this regard. Yet, the BNP’s political legitimacy is largely based on a narrative of “protecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty” vis-à-vis external actors, particularly India, and it has repeatedly expressed strong stances on issues such as border killings and water-sharing. Also, while the new government in Dhaka has extended an olive branch to New Delhi, Pakistan is likely to invite Prime Minister Tarique Rahman as the chief guest to the Pakistan Day parade next month, indicating continued rapprochement between Dhaka and Islamabad.
Moreover, if the BNP-led government is viewed as ‘too soft’ on India by opposition parties, such as the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP), it is likely to face significant domestic political backlash. Similarly, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP) government would be hard-pressed to make any concessions to Bangladesh, especially as the BJP’s domestic political narrative heavily uses anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric.
Hence, it is highly unlikely that the Indo–Bangladeshi partnership is going to reach the level it achieved under the Awami League government. But it would be in the interests of both Dhaka and New Delhi if they cooperated on a range of issues, including water-sharing, transnational crimes, migration, trade, and connectivity, and such cooperation would prevent the outbreak of conflict. Particularly, the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty is set to expire on 12 December 2026, and the two parties would need to negotiate to avert another crisis about the sharing the waters of the transboundary Ganges River. On the other hand, issues such as Bangladesh’s growing strategic ties with China, Pakistan, and Turkey, border killings, the potential denationalization of millions of Bengalis in Assam, and the use of xenophobic rhetoric in domestic politics would continue to complicate bilateral ties and preclude full concord. Thus, under the BNP-led government, Indo–Bangladeshi relationship is likely to slide towards full compartmentalization.
By: Md. Himel Rahman
[Md. Himel Rahman is currently serving as Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His articles have been published on several platforms, including The Diplomat, The Interpreter, Asia Times, South Asian Voices, The Nation, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, and New Age.]
