In the shifting landscape of Middle East geopolitics, Israel’s so-called threat perceptions are undergoing a dramatic recalibration. For decades, Iran (along with its proxy network and allies like Syria’s Assad regime) was framed as Israel’s paramount adversary. Today, however, a new narrative is taking hold in Israeli strategic discourse: Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is being cast as the next great enemy, potentially even eclipsing Iran. This shift was first identified by us.: We noted that right after the de facto removal of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad as a regional factor in December 2024, Tel Aviv began redirecting its threat narrative from Iran to Turkey.
After Assad: A New “Primary Threat” Emerges
Israel’s reorientation toward Turkey as a looming enemy accelerated with changes in Syria. As Syria’s civil war upended the old order – and Bashar al-Assad’s regime lost its grip – Israeli strategists began voicing alarm at what might come next. An Israeli government panel known as the Nagel Committee (headed by former National Security Council chief Jacob Nagel) warned in early 2025 that Turkey’s ambitions in a post-Assad Syria could pose an even “greater threat” to Israel than Iran did under Assad’s patronage.
The committee’s report, delivered to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, painted a scenario in which an Islamist-led rebel alliance backed by Turkey topples Assad and establishes a hostile Sunni regime in Damascus – a regime that would refuse to recognize Israel and potentially be more dangerous “in some respects… no less severe than the previous [Iranian] one”. In this worst-case outlook, Turkey essentially turns Syria into a proxy protectorate, projecting influence via factions like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – the hardline Sunni militia that led the campaign against Assad.
Israeli think-tanks and media quickly amplified this narrative. A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs brief noted that senior Israeli security officials view Turkey’s growing footprint in Syria as a “significant new threat”. It cited the Nagel Committee’s conclusion that Ankara’s drive to “restore [the] Ottoman crown to its former glory” could destabilize the region and directly endanger Israel. The core fear is geographic proximity and ideological extremism: a Turkish-backed Islamist regime next door might be less constrained than distant Iran was under Assad’s sovereignty. Military Intelligence assessments started referring to Turkey’s militarization of northern Syria as a “new northern threat” – even potentially greater than the traditional Iranian threat – marking “a seismic shift in Israeli threat calculations,” according to one comprehensive analysis of Israeli media discourse. Concerns ranged from Turkish air defense systems in Syria that could limit Israel’s freedom of action to the possibility of direct skirmishes if Israeli jets strike too close to Turkish units.
Moreover, Channel 12’s defense correspondent Sabrina Levy remarked that the focus has shifted “squarely on the Turkish threat, which is seen as even more dangerous than Iran”, especially now that “Syria is on the verge of becoming Turkey’s proxy on Israel’s border”. Indeed, after Assad’s fall, Israeli officials fear they may soon see “Turkish soldiers on the streets of Damascus,” in the stark words of one expert. The Salafi militant proxies, previously supported by Israel and its allies, including the US, in Syria to undermine Iran and its allies, have now become ‘adversaries’ of Israel. As Tamir Hayman, head of Israel’s INSS think tank, noted, the interim Syrian president is viewed in Tel Aviv as “a highly problematic Islamist figure… surrounded by former jihadist fighters,” fueling fears that a militant Sunni state may take root next door. In effect, Israel finds itself confronting a Turkey-enabled Islamist axis in Syria, very different from (but no less threatening than) the Iranian-Shiite axis it knew.
Some Israeli and international media outlets reported that Turkey scoped out at least three Syrian airbases—T4 and Palmyra in Homs province, and a main airport in Hama—as potential sites for establishing military infrastructure under a proposed defense pact with Syria’s interim government. Turkish teams, including engineers, were said to have conducted inspections of runways, hangars, and command facilities at these locations.
On April 2–3, 2025, Israel carried out coordinated airstrikes on these three facilities, deliberately targeting them just hours before Turkish inspection teams were expected to arrive. Key infrastructure such as runways and hangars—especially at the T‑4 airbase—were destroyed, rendering the base “totally unusable” according to Syrian sources.
Unconfirmed reports surfaced that at least three Turkish nationals—described by some sources as engineers—were killed in the strikes, allegedly while inspecting what was to be a future Turkish installation at the T‑4 site. However, major outlets stress that these casualties remain preliminary and have not been verified by Turkish or Israeli officials, and remain subject to further confirmation.
Israeli officials framed the strikes as a preventive action to block Turkey from establishing a military foothold near its northern border, warning that Turkey had crossed a “red line” by planning military deployment in Syria, which Israel views as a direct threat.
Notably, Netanyahu himself began to publicly allude to concerns about Turkey right after those strikes. he told reporters that while Israel sought no clash, “we don’t want to see Syria being used by anyone, including Turkey, as a base for attack in Israel”. In closed-door meetings, he was even more blunt: if needed, Israel “would not hesitate to act” against Turkish forces in Syria to defend itself.
During his visit to Washington following the incident, he discussed ‘mechanisms’ to avoid conflict but also stressed Israel’s “legitimate concerns” about Turkey to President Trump. The subtext is that Israel wants international backing as it draws new red lines against Turkey, analogous to the coordination Israel had with Russia to deconflict over Syria in the past. Besides his “we won’t hesitate to act” comment regarding Turkey in Syria, he has lobbied Washington to “curb Turkey’s growing influence” in the region.
Netanyahu has already had a long history of confrontational exchanges with Erdogan. As far back as 2018, during a heated war of words, Netanyahu criticized Turkey by stating that it occupies Northern Cyprus and “slaughters civilians” in Syria’s Afrin region. He advised Ankara to get off its high horse. Other Israeli officials also publicly likened the Turkish president to the Middle East’s worst villains. Israel’s foreign minister Israel Katz accused Erdogan of “following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein” – a none-too-subtle reference to the fate of a despot who warred with Israel’s allies. Former PM Yair Lapid was similarly blistering, calling Erdogan “a danger to the Middle East” and urging NATO to condemn his “outrageous threats against Israel” and his patronage of Hamas.
Israel’s recasting of Turkey as “the new Iran” was already reverberating in international policy circles even before Assad’s removal, with talk of sanctions, military embargoes, and even NATO repercussions on the horizon.
Israel’s Past Tolerance of Salafi Jihadists in Syria
Ironically, Israel’s new alarm over a Sunni Islamist menace in Syria comes after years of Israel tacitly tolerating – even quietly supporting – Sunni jihadist factions during the Syrian civil war. Throughout the 2010s, Israel viewed Assad’s Iran-backed regime as the greater evil and often turned a blind eye to (or covertly aided) anti-Assad rebel groups, including hardline Salafi militias. In fact, top Israeli officials have belatedly admitted that Israel provided arms and funding to Syrian rebels along its Golan Heights frontier. Former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot disclosed in 2019 that Israel “had indeed provided weaponry to Syrian rebel groups in the Golan Heights” during the war, after years of official denials. This support, initially explained as helping local fighters defend themselves, was an open secret: Foreign Policy reported Israel covertly armed at least 12 rebel factions from 2013 onward, even paying fighters a $75 monthly. The goal was to undermine Assad, prevent Iran-backed forces and keep Syria fragmented.
This policy meant that Israel effectively abetted the rise of Sunni militant outfits on its doorstep – groups that, ideologically, were hardly friends of Israel. It treated these rebels as the “lesser enemy” compared to Assad and Iran. Israeli hospitals quietly treated wounded Syrian fighters; the IDF’s “Operation Good Neighbor” delivered humanitarian aid and arms to opposition-held areas. Some of these same factions had ties to Salafi-Jihadist networks like Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch (al-Nusra Front, later rebranded as HTS). At the time, Israeli defense officials downplayed the risks, reasoning that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” – at least temporarily.
Now, however, with HTS and its allies in control of Syria—ruling from Damascus after Assad’s ouster—thanks to Turkish sponsorship and backing from Israel and the United States, it is Israel that is suddenly sounding the alarm. Jerusalem now finds itself dreading the very Frankenstein it once tolerated, encouraged and supported: an Islamist authority in Damascus – only this time beholden not to Tehran, but to Ankara.
How Erdoğan Enables Israel’s Narrative
Ironically, if Israel is “manufacturing” a new enemy in Turkey, President Erdoğan has been more than willing to supply the raw materials. Much like Iran’s hardliners once lent credence to Israel’s worst depictions by chanting about wiping Israel off the map. Erdoğan’s own actions and rhetoric have made it easier for Israel to demonize him. Domestically, Erdoğan has steered Turkey toward authoritarianism since the staged 2016 coup attempt, crushing dissent in ways that alienate even potential allies. Over the past decade, he unleashed an unprecedented crackdown on opposition and his critics, including journalists. Major opposition figures like Istanbul’s popular mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu have recently been jailed or barred from office in what observers describe as politically motivated purges.. This consolidation of one-man rule has eroded Turkey’s democracy and tarnished Erdoğan’s image across the West. It also convinces Israel (and many Turks) that Erdoğan will stop at nothing to retain power, even if that means stoking nationalism or foreign adventures to rally support. In effect, his authoritarian bent feeds the narrative that Turkey under Erdoğan is an unstable, aggressive actor – the kind of regime that needs an external confrontation to justify its oppression at home.
On the foreign stage, Erdoğan’s adventurism has been on full display. He has pursued military interventions or power projection in multiple theaters – from Syria to Libya, from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean – often with an Islamist undertone that alarms Israel. In Syria, Turkey’s forces and allied militias have pushed ever deeper since the civil war, ostensibly to fight Kurdish militants and ISIS, but also to oust Assad and expand Turkey’s influence. Israeli hawks claim that after Assad’s fall, Ankara threw its weight behind Sunni rebel factions (including hardline Islamist groups) to shape the new Damascus government. Western intelligence even alleges that Turkey helped facilitate the flow of jihadist fighters into Syria and supported the coalition led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an extremist group once tied to Al-Qaeda – as they toppled Assad. The result: the new Syrian president is effectively seen as a Turkish proxy (HTS’s leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, rebranded as “Ahmed al-Sharaa”).
Erdoğan’s own fiery anti-Israel rhetoric pours fuel on the fire. He positions himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause – and frequently of Hamas in particular. By late October 2023, after Hamas attacks, he openly told his AK Party parliamentarians that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a liberation group…waging a battle to protect its lands and people,” drawing Israel’s expected outrage. Turkey pointedly hosts Hamas officials on its soil and refuses to designate the group as terrorists. And after an Israeli strike in Gaza killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s family, Erdoğan led a massive rally in Istanbul, thundering that “the whole Muslim world” must unite against Israeli atrocities – even praying “May Allah bring destruction upon Zionist Israel“. Israeli hawks quickly seized upon such language as evidence that Erdoğan is a radical Islamist focused on confrontation.
Erdoğan’s assertive moves in other regions also enables Israel’s case. He has armed and supported groups like the Tripoli-based Islamist faction in Libya, deployed Turkish troops and drones that tipped the balance in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and steadfastly defended the Muslim Brotherhood network (from Egypt to Gaza). Each of these ventures, while driven by Ankara’s own interests, has the side effect of antagonizing different players: France and Egypt in Libya, Iran and Russia in the Caucasus, Saudi Arabia and UAE over the Brotherhood – and now Israel over Hamas and Syria. In Israel’s telling, this is not a series of individual policy choices but a coherent neo-Ottoman campaign: a quest to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, in which Israel is cast as a foil. When Erdoğan muses that Aleppo or Homs would still be Turkish if World War I’s outcome had been different, or when he vows “as we entered Karabakh and Libya, we will do the same to Israel,” it plays directly into Israeli hands. These statements (the latter made in July 2024 during a party conference) are splashed across Israeli media as smoking guns – evidence that Erdoğan’s Turkey is an expansionist power dreaming of regional hegemony at Israel’s expense. In truth, most of Erdoğan’s bluster is domestic posturing to boost nationalist sentiment. But combined with Turkey’s real military build-up (e.g. testing new Tayfun ballistic missiles and pledging to accelerate missile production after the Gaza war), it creates a credibility problem for Ankara. Turkey’s president says he aims to deter threats – yet to Israel, it looks like Turkey itself is becoming the threat.
To put it succinctly, Erdoğan has enabled Israel’s new narrative in much the same way Iran’s hardline leaders once did. Tehran’s revolutionary sloganeering and support for groups like Hezbollah allowed Israel to successfully cast Iran as an existential villain for years. Now, Erdoğan’s authoritarian streak and Islamist zealotry are allowing Israel to cast Turkey in a similar light. This does not absolve Israel’s propagandists for exaggeration – but it underscores that Ankara’s own missteps have made it easier for Israel to sell the idea of “Turkey the threat.” A Turkey that was democratic at home, pragmatic abroad, and careful in its words would be much harder to portray as a villain. Unfortunately, today’s Turkey is often its own worst enemy, handing Israel ample ammunition (sometimes literally) to construct a menacing caricature.
Northern Cyprus and the New Threat Narrative
Perhaps the most striking (and puzzling) example of this emerging narrative is Northern Cyprus. For over 50 years, Israel treated the division of Cyprus as a distant quarrel between Greeks and Turks. Yet today, Israeli officials and commentators are abruptly treating Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus as a dire security threat to Israel itself. In a recent Israel Hayom piece, analyst Shay Gal argues that Northern Cyprus has become a lawless “no-man’s land” enabling Turkey, Hamas, and even Iran’s Quds Force to operate freely on Europe’s fringe. The article paints a dramatic picture: an abandoned airfield turned drone base at Lefkoniko now hosts armed Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones that could strike Israeli gas rigs and ships within minutes. Turkish Atmaca anti-ship missiles, it warns, threaten Israeli offshore gas platforms, and a new “Typhoon” ballistic missile deployed in Northern Cyprus would represent “Turkey’s first direct ballistic threat to Israel,” capable of reaching Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa. The same piece alleges the occupied north has become a haven for illicit finance and terror plotting – citing documents that Hamas planned an operational branch in Turkey and Northern Cyprus to target Israelis in Europe, and that an Iranian Quds Force cell there plotted attacks on Israelis. In short, Israel’s narrative now casts Northern Cyprus as a kind of outpost of Turkish-Iranian terror on the Mediterranean, a “strategic threat” right on NATO’s doorstep.
Such claims mark a stunning shift. Inconsistencies abound: How credible is a full-blown Turkish-Iranian partnership operating out of Northern Cyprus, given Ankara and Tehran’s historical rivalry? Why is Israel sounding the alarm about Turkey’s decades-old occupation only now? The timing suggests strategic narrative construction. By inflating the Northern Cyprus issue, Israeli hardliners knit together disparate threats (Iran’s terror proxies, Hamas, and Turkey’s military) into one menacing tapestry. This serves multiple political motives. It bolsters Israel’s burgeoning alliance with Greece and the Greek Cypriots – even entertaining the notion of Israel joining a future contingency operation to “liberate” Northern Cyprus from Turkey if things worsen. (Indeed, Israel Hayom mused that Israel, Greece, and Cyprus “must prepare a contingency operation” to oust Turkey’s forces from the island’s north if Turkish threats cross a red line.) It also justifies Israel’s own military build-up by invoking a new frontline in the eastern Mediterranean. The narrative conveniently amplifies Turkey’s most provocative actions – for example, Ankara’s unilateral stationing of drones and rumored missile sites in Northern Cyprus – while ignoring the fact that Israel largely ignored this situation for years when it wasn’t politically useful. By selectively hyping Turkey’s moves now, Israeli officials can claim a multi-front threat (from Gaza to Lebanon to Cyprus) that keeps public fear – and defense funding – flowing.
This new narrative has concrete policy implications. Israel has elevated its partnerships with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus to unprecedented levels, sharing intelligence and coordinating defenses against Turkish moves. Joint air force drills simulate scenarios like confronting Turkish fighters or drones. Israeli officials openly criticize Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine (which lays expansive Turkish claims in the Mediterranean).
In this regard, Israel has also become a key partner in Southern Cyprus’s regional strategy. During Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza, Greek Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides visited Tel Aviv in a show of solidarity. Israel and Cyprus are also collaborating on military exercises, energy infrastructure, and humanitarian corridor proposals—many of which observers suspect are cover for more strategic objectives. Haaretz recently revealed that U.S. military cargo destined for Israel is being routed through the British RAF base in Southern Cyprus. Over 40 American aircraft and 20 British planes have landed at RAF Akrotiri, with suspicions they are transferring weapons to Israel. The UK Ministry of Defence declined to comment.
To be sure, Turkey’s behavior has provided plenty of fodder. Erdoğan’s government did convert Lefkoniko into a drone base and flew advanced UAVs over the island. Turkish warships and exploration vessels roamed disputed East Med waters in recent years, raising tensions. And just this July, Turkey’s military paraded new drones in Northern Cyprus on the anniversary of the 1974 invasion, sending a defiant message. But Israel’s alarmist framing goes further, portraying these moves as an existential threat to Israel itself. The idea that Northern Cyprus would become a launchpad for strikes on Israeli cities – while theoretically possible – assumes a level of Turkish hostility and risk-taking that most analysts find far-fetched. It also glosses over the reality that Israel possesses one of the world’s most sophisticated multi-layer air defense systems (from Arrow-3 exoatmospheric interceptors down to Iron Dome) precisely to counter missile threats. In other words, the strategic context is far more complex than the soundbite that “Northern Cyprus is Israel’s new Gaza.” Yet by repeating that soundbite often enough, Israeli hawks hope to cement a public perception of encirclement: Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, Hamas to the south – a trifecta of terror justifying perpetual vigilance.
Real Estate, Real Concerns
A growing wave of Israeli property acquisitions in both Northern and Southern Cyprus has ignited a fierce political and diplomatic debate, particularly over concerns that these purchases could signal a long-term demographic and strategic shift.
In Northern Cyprus, former TRNC officials and local media have warned that Israeli companies and individuals are acquiring thousands of acres through shell corporations, using European and Turkish passports to evade scrutiny. Sabahattin Ismail, a former advisor to TRNC President Rauf Denktaş, claimed that three major Israeli-linked companies—Afik Group, Evergreen Developments Group, and Eurocoast Group—have gained unlimited rights to property acquisition by registering as Turkish Cypriot firms. These acquisitions are concentrated in coastal regions with strategic significance, raising alarms over sovereignty, demographic balance, and long-term security.
Even Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan acknowledged the issue, stating that the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is actively monitoring real estate transactions by Israeli citizens. While official numbers cite only around 200 Israeli applications since 2000, experts argue this vastly underrepresents the true scale due to dual citizenship and proxy ownership.
The Cyprus Foundation recently issued a stark public warning, calling the land rush a “silent occupation” and comparing it to early Zionist settlement strategies in Palestine. “We warn the Turkish Cypriot people about land sales to Zionists and invite them to put an end to this ‘silent occupation’. Let Cyprus not become another Palestine!” read their statement.
Simultaneously, in Southern Cyprus, Israeli investment has skyrocketed. Government figures now place Israeli nationals as the fourth-largest group of foreign property buyers. In cities like Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos, Israelis have purchased over 1,400 properties, often transforming them into luxury gated communities complete with spas, schools, and synagogues.
Stefanos Stefanou, leader of Cyprus’ second-largest party AKEL, also issued a stark warning at a recent party congress: “If we don’t take effective action now, one day we’ll find that this country is no longer ours.” He accused Israeli investors of creating closed communities, establishing Zionist religious institutions, and seeking influence over key economic sectors. His remarks were immediately condemned by Israel’s ambassador to Cyprus as antisemitic—a response AKEL firmly rejected, arguing the critique targeted unregulated foreign land acquisition, not ethnicity.
The debate escalated with viral TikTok videos mocking the land purchases, including clips of individuals impersonating ultra-Orthodox Jews declaring, “God promised us Cyprus after Israel” and “If we don’t steal them, someone else will.”
AKEL has since proposed legislation to restrict bulk property sales near military zones and tighten the “golden visa” program. But so far, the Cypriot government has hesitated to act decisively, possibly wary of jeopardizing its deepening ties with Israel.
In both parts of the island, the Jewish outreach organization Chabad appears to have played a quiet but central role in expanding Israeli presence. Rabbi Chaim Azimov, who established Chabad in the TRNC in 2006, recently fled back to the U.S. under murky circumstances. Allegedly involved in real estate deals and casino partnerships, Azimov was accused of encouraging Israelis to invest in Northern Cyprus as part of a broader Zionist strategy. This fuels further suspicion that the wave of purchases is not merely economic, but political—a slow-motion strategic encroachment.
Beyond political and financial concerns, a deep mistrust of Israel has taken root not only among Greek Cypriot communities but among Kurds as well—fueling a belief that Israel instrumentalizes even sympathetic causes for its expansionist ambitions.
PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan explicitly warned that Israel doesn’t genuinely support Kurdish or pro‑Kurdish causes. He argued that Israel sees Kurds as pawns for a broader strategic project—employing them as proxies in a “greater Israel” plan. Öcalan cautioned that if Israel ever gained control over Kurdish territories, it would likely replicate Gaza’s catastrophic outcome for the Kurdish people, leaving them “like Gaza” once Israel’s interests had been served.
This skepticism reflects wider regional sentiment: Israel’s activism—even when pro‑Greek or pro‑Kurdish—is now doubted. Critics believe these efforts are not altruistic, but rather align with a broader effort to embed Israeli influence under the guise of solidarity. Within Cypriot debates—especially surrounding Israeli purchases in both northern and southern zones—this deep-seated suspicion has hardened: Israel is distrusted not only militarily, but morally and politically.
Even when Israel expresses pro‑Kurdish rhetoric, Öcalan and others interpret it through a lens of strategic manipulation rather than genuine support. The belief is that activist platforms, solidarity networks, and real estate investments form part of a coordinated plan—one that positions Israel for long-term leverage on Cyprus and beyond. Honest cause-based activism, in contrast, is viewed through a prism of distrust.
The Military-Industrial Complex and Political Theater
Behind these narrative shifts lie cold strategic calculations. Israel’s security establishment – a powerful nexus of the military, intelligence agencies, and the booming defense industry – has a vested interest in identifying new threats. With Iran constrained (its nuclear ambitions slowed by sanctions/US bombing and its proxy network bloodied) and Syria’s Assad neutralized, Israel’s generals and arms contractors face a potential “threat vacuum.” Simply put, without a compelling external enemy, it’s harder to justify $20+ billion defense budgets, continual R&D for new weapons, or lucrative U.S. security aid packages. As cynical as it sounds, military bureaucracies often seek out or inflate threats to sustain themselves. The timing of the Turkey-as-threat narrative fits this pattern. Israel’s doctrine of “security through domination” means it will always look for the next rival that could challenge its regional hegemony. Turkey, a rising power with a large military, conveniently checks all the boxes: geographically close, occasionally hostile, not easily subdued – in short, an ideal “national bogeyman” to rally against.
Within Israel, this narrative also serves domestic political purposes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, embattled by internal controversies (not least his judicial overhaul crisis and public discontent during the Gaza war), benefits from redirecting attention to an external foe. His hard-right coalition thrives on a siege mentality. Portraying Turkey as a looming menace helps unite Israel’s fractious society around a common fear and distracts from internal issues. It is telling that the Nagel Committee’s dire warnings about Turkey emerged just as Netanyahu’s government was under heavy criticism at home – a coincidence not lost on Israeli critics. Some have pointed out the theatrical aspect of the recent Turkey-Israel war scare. For instance, when the Nagel report headlines blared “Israel must prepare for war with Turkey,” even pro-Israel observers were perplexed – Turkey and Israel were, until recently, improving ties, so why the sudden talk of war?. The answer lies partly in the shifting geopolitical landscape (the Syria factor and post-Gaza fallout), but also in the self-perpetuating nature of military planning: once a scenario is imagined, budgets and contingency plans soon follow. Israeli pundits have begun calling this the “new long-term doctrine” – replacing the Iran-centric focus of the 2000s with a Turkey-centric focus for the coming decades.
On the Turkish side, a similar dynamic of political theater exists. President Erdoğan has for years turned antagonism with Israel into domestic political capital. Whenever facing electoral pressure or economic woes, he ramps up the Palestine rhetoric, knowing it plays well with his conservative base. Depicting Israel as a genocidal villain (as Ankara did throughout the 2023 Gaza war, even accusing Israel of “expansionist Zionism” and genocide) serves to deflect blame for Turkey’s own problems and present Erdoğan as the defender of the ummah (global Muslim community). In recent speeches, Turkish officials have explicitly warned that Israel, having crushed enemies in Gaza and Syria, will come after Turkey next. Even ultra-nationalist allies of Erdoğan, like MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, fuel this narrative – claiming Israel’s strategic goal is to “encircle [the] Anatolian landmass” and sabotage Turkey from within. Bahçeli went so far as to suggest Israel might try to torpedo Turkey’s delicate talks with Kurdish insurgents, a conspiracy theory that resonates with Turkish public fears. By espousing such views, Ankara’s leadership is effectively casting Israel as a primary threat to Turkey’s security – a mirror image of Israel’s narrative about Turkey. Thus, we have a vicious cycle of mutual demonization: each side’s military-industrial-political complex finds validation in the other’s threatening posture.
It is worth noting that not everyone in Israel is on board with demonizing Turkey. Some opposition voices and veterans of Israel’s foreign service worry that this “two-front animosity” – against both Iran and Turkey – is overstated and could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The danger is that this self-reinforcing hostility can translate from words into action. Already we see tit-for-tat moves that inch the two countries closer to the brink. Israel cultivates closer military ties with Greece, Cyprus, and even Armenian groups, implicitly aimed at containing Turkey. Turkey, in turn, fast-tracks its missile programs, conducts naval drills with an eye toward Greece/Israel, and doubles down on its presence in Syria despite Israeli airstrikes there. The rhetoric from both sides’ leadership has normalized talk of confrontation. What was once unthinkable – a clash between the IDF and the Turkish Armed Forces – is now openly contemplated by strategists in Tel Aviv and Ankara alike. In Israeli Knesset committees, Turkey is discussed alongside Iran and Hezbollah as a potential belligerent. In Turkey’s National Security Council (the “Red Book”), reports suggest Israel is being elevated as a major threat to the state. Each bureaucracy is effectively preparing for war with the other “just in case.” As history shows, intense preparations and propaganda can sometimes become self-fulfilling prophecies—but not in the short or mid term, especially if Turkey remains under Erdoğan’s rule, as we have explained previously here.
