Summary by Geopolist | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics
The article “America’s Foreign Policy Inertia” sheds light on the difficulties that the leaders of the United States of America encounter while attempting to adjust the nation’s foreign policy to the changing circumstances of the global community. The inertia of institutions, which is strongly embedded in the structure that was established after World War II and during the Cold War, is a considerable hurdle. As can be observed during the administrations of Presidents Trump and Biden, bureaucracies, Congress, and foreign interests frequently oppose significant administrative and legislative changes. Although both projects sought to reorient United States foreign policy, they were faced with significant opposition, which highlights how difficult it is to make significant policy shifts in the intricate ecology that Washington contains.
Key points;
Institutional Ecosystem of U.S. Foreign Policy:
The foundation for United States foreign policy is based on a system that was established during and after World War II, with the intention of experiencing expansion throughout the time of the Cold War. Bureaucratic bodies such as the Department of Defence, the Department of State, and intelligence agencies are included in this system. These institutions were crucial in the United States’ rise to the position of global superpower on the international stage.
When it comes to change, however, these very same institutions are extremely resistant. The majority of the time, bureaucracies will protect their missions and resources by viewing significant shifts as potential dangers. Because of this, initiatives to alter the foreign policy of the United States of America frequently run into opposition from many institutions.
Presidential Efforts to Overcome Inertia:
Under the administration of Donald Trump, several efforts were made to reduce the United States’ military commitments overseas. These efforts included the withdrawal of troops from Syria and the reduction of personnel in Europe. On the other hand, these attempts were faced with significant resistance from the bureaucracy. The strategy that Trump used was frequently unilateral, and he avoided following established protocols, which resulted in additional opposition. On the other hand, he was successful in withdrawing from the nuclear deal with Iran, which was an action that was in line with the long-standing goals of certain political forces.
During his time in office, President Joe Biden had the intention of reorienting the United States’ attention toward Asia, as outlined in the “pivot to Asia” from the Obama administration. However, his administration has been dominated by events that have occurred in Europe and the Middle East, particularly the chaotic departure from Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite the fact that President Biden initially intended to lessen the United States’ participation in these places, his administration ultimately ended up boosting commitments as a result of the emerging crises. This demonstrates the strength of institutional and geopolitical forces to derail policy change
Bureaucratic and Congressional Resistance:
Third, resistance from the bureaucracy and Congress: Presidents of the United States frequently encounter opposition from the bureaucracy, which is designed to preserve the status quo. Every move that was made to reduce the number of military involvement in other countries, such as President Obama’s attempt to close Guantanamo Bay or President Trump’s pullout from Syria, was met with resistance from the bureaucracy. Information is leaked, policy implementation is slowed down, or bureaucrats blatantly disobey orders to maintain the policies that are already in place.
Moreover, Congress is a significant factor in the process of preventing change. Legislative entities can hinder changes in foreign policy by opposing budgets or treaties, which makes it difficult for any president to implement a new strategy. Party politics can be the driving force behind political resistance, particularly in a government that is evenly divided, rather than substantive disagreements on foreign policy.
Psychological and Sociological Factors:
Inertia in foreign policy is one of the factors that can be attributed to human psychology, which is also influenced by sociological factors. One example of a fallacy is the sunk cost fallacy, which leads individuals to be reluctant to discontinue a course of action that is not working because they believe they can still recover prior investments. Policies that are already in place are further solidified by conformity and the fear of acknowledging mistakes. In order to preserve their credibility or career prospects, politicians and analysts frequently refrain from deviating from the general opinion. This practice contributes to the formation of a larger echo chamber that stifles innovation in the realm of foreign policy.
The Impact of Recent Crises:
The essay highlights the fact that significant shifts in the United States’ foreign policy are feasible, particularly during times of crisis, despite the hurdles that have been presented there. The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, despite being chaotic, finally brought an end to a war that had lasted for twenty years, demonstrating that significant improvements can be achieved under pressure.
Emergencies, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can present opportunities for policy adjustments, as evidenced by the United States’ concerted efforts to provide assistance to Ukraine. The United States, on the other hand, continued to behave in the same way it had in the past, including mobilizing allies and retaining its leadership position in terms of global security, even throughout these times. This exemplifies how difficult it is to break free from the prevalent “operating code” that the United States government uses to govern its foreign policy.
The Way Forward: Present and Future Opportunities and Obstacles:
The next administration of the United States, whether it is led by Trump or Harris in 2025, will be presented with several possibilities to alter its course of action. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the commitment of the United States to NATO, and the shifting of the burden of defence onto European allies are among the most significant challenges.
Seizing Crisis as Opportunity:
If there is to be any kind of major change in foreign policy, it will not only take a strong political will, but also a smart strategy to manage the resistance from the bureaucracy. The article implies that a cautious and deliberate strategy would be more effective than directly addressing entrenched interests. This conclusion is reached in the context of the essay. This might include presenting changes as updates to existing rules rather than drastic shifts, which would effectively reduce opposition to the proposed changes.
Concluding remarks:
The paper concludes that the United States of America is currently at a crucial crossroads in terms of its foreign policy. Although the nation is confronted with growing global issues that call for adaptation, institutional inertia continues to create barriers to growth. The United States runs the risk of repeating the errors of previous empires if it does not have proactive leadership and a clear plan to overcome these hurdles. This would mean that the United States would overextend itself on several fronts without addressing the underlying reasons that drive its foreign policy lethargy.
To successfully manage these intricate dynamics, future presidents will need to be careful to capitalize on times of crisis to bring about significant reforms while also striking a balance between the entrenched interests of Washington’s foreign policy ecosystem. If they are successful, they have the potential to push the United States toward a role in international affairs that is more sustainable and strategically coherent.
Read the full article here.
