China and Russia’s Joint Bomber Exercise Near Alaska: A Strategic Show of Force

Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise near Alaska?

On July 24, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) intercepted two Chinese Xian H-6K bombers and two Russian Tu-95MS Bear bombers flying near Alaska. Both types of bombers are nuclear capable. The bombers were intercepted by American F-16s and F-35s and Canadian CF-18 fighter jets. While the aircraft remained in international airspace and did not fly into Canadian or U.S. sovereign airspace, they were operating in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). These joint flights come at a time of growing great power competition and solidifying the Chinese-Russian “no limits” partnership. This incident was the first of its kind for the two countries, showing a willingness of Beijing and Moscow to extend cooperation to their strategic nuclear forces and signaling their continued testing of U.S. resolve, including through actions in proximity to the U.S. homeland.

Q1: Is it normal for China and Russia to conduct joint patrols in the Pacific?

A1: This is the first time China and Russia have conducted a joint patrol near Alaska and in the northern Pacific. It is also the first time that Chinese and Russian aircraft have taken off from the same Russian air base.

The bombers came within 200 miles of the coast of Alaska. While staying within international airspace, they did fly through Alaska’s ADIZ—airspace that is controlled for national security reasons, where aircraft are required to identify themselves. According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defence, the countries were conducting joint strategic air patrols in a “new area of joint operations” with two Chinese Xian H-6 planes and two Russian Tu-95 bombers, escorted by Russian fighter jets.

This is the eighth joint bomber flight that China and Russia have conducted since 2019. The previous bomber flights were conducted in the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and Western Pacific, with some flying through the ADIZ of Japan and South Korea. Not just limited to bombers, Chinese and Russian joint air and maritime patrols in the Indo-Pacific have also become more frequent, suggesting a deepening and broadening level of bilateral cooperation since Beijing and Moscow declared a “no limits” partnership in 2022.

Q2: Why are Russia and China conducting joint patrols and why now?

A2: A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense said the purpose of the strategic air patrol was “further testing and enhancing the level of cooperation between the two air forces, as well as deepening strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation between the two countries.” He also stressed that it was not aimed at any third parties and “has nothing to do with the current international and regional situation.” Given the growing competition in the region, including rising nuclear risks, this statement should be viewed in a wider context. As a result of their continued cooperation, China and Russia are demonstrating that they can jointly project military power in the region and reach the U.S. homeland, while also building greater operational proficiency among their military forces. This patrol is just the latest manifestation of increasing military cooperation and sophistication in the China-Russia partnership.

The timing of these flights could also be seen as a counter to high-profile international events between the United States and its allies in the region. Beijing and Moscow have done this in the past. In May 2022, coincident with a meeting of Quad leaders in Tokyo, Chinese H-6 bombers and Russian Tu-95 bombers flew near Japanese airspace, leading Japan to scramble fighter jets in response.

Now, this incident comes as the United States, along with 28 allies and partners, carries out its biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercise—the world’s largest international maritime exercise, which earlier this month included a test of a B-2 bomber sinking a maritime target. China was not invited after abusing past invites. It also comes as U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken are visiting Japan for the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting, which will be followed by Austin’s visit to the Philippines—which has expanded its defense cooperation with the United States under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Additionally, on August 6, Austin will host an Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultation in Annapolis. These and other initiatives, such as the Nuclear Consultative Group with South Korea and the Australia-UK-U.S. agreement on joint development of nuclear submarines and technology sharing, point to a strengthening of alliances to posture against intensifying Chinese and North Korean military activities in the region and further Russian aggression in and beyond Ukraine.

While Beijing and Moscow may assert the exercises are a means of counterbalancing Western influence and attempting to divide the United States from its allies, they seem to be having the opposite effect.

Q3: Are these bomber flights part of a broader military cooperation agenda between China and Russia?

A3: Both Beijing and Moscow have described past joint bomber flights as being conducted “in accordance with their annual military cooperation plan” (author’s translation). This plan, designed to enhance the strategic partnership and coordination between their armed forces, has manifested through various military activities, including joint air patrols, naval exercises, and training missions. Their partnership has also expanded to nuclear, space, and industrial base cooperation.

The Chinese and Russian navies have engaged in joint exercises since 2012, including exercises in the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Arctic. Last summer, a flotilla of 11 ships sailed near the coast of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, comprised of Chinese and Russian destroyers, an intelligence collection ship, and other support vessels. This month, the two navies commenced their annual joint maritime patrol in the Asia-Pacific region, including a three-day exercise in the South China Sea.

In 2018, China declared itself a “Near-Arctic State” and expressed an interest in the Arctic for both economic and strategic reasons. As the polar ice caps melt, the region could open up new shipping lanes that would be of particular value to China in expanding its trade routes with an “Ice Silk Road.” A 2022 RAND study concluded that China does not have a major presence in the region, but “not for lack of trying,” having dispatched numerous research expeditions and attempting to conclude a $150 million gold mine deal, which was blocked by Canada. China may be seeking to leverage Russia’s presence in the Arctic as it attempts to gain a stronger foothold in the region.

Beyond joint strategic bomber flights, the partnership includes nuclear cooperation. Since 2018, China has regularly sent forces to participate in Russia’s annual military district-level exercises (e.g., Kavkaz, Tsentr, Vostok, and Zapad). Additionally, in early 2023, Western media reported that Rosatom—Russia’s state-run nuclear energy corporation—was supplying China with thousands of kilograms of highly enriched uranium to fuel fast breeder reactors. U.S. officials believe that these reactors will produce weapons-grade plutonium for Beijing’s nuclear weapons program.

Relating to space and missile defense, Beijing and Moscow signed technology transfer agreements in 2017 and 2019, although it is unclear whether such transfers between the two countries have increased. However, Chinese firms have provided the Wagner Group with satellite imagery to assist its combat operations in Ukraine.

Finally, China plays a key role in supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing is providing Russia with “dual-use material and components for weapons,” which has only increased since Russia invaded Ukraine.

Q4: Were the flights intentionally escalatory and should we expect more of them?

A4: Alaskan national security leaders have highlighted the potentially escalatory nature of Chinese-Russian flights. U.S. senator Lisa Murkowski described the patrol as an “unprecedented provocation by our adversaries,” while U.S. senator Dan Sullivan declared, “Make no mistake, this is an escalation.”

Intercepts in the Alaska ADIZ, however, are far from unusual: on average, NORAD conducted six to seven intercepts of Russian aircraft annually between 2007 and 2023. While the presence of Chinese bombers in this latest patrol is new, the operation follows a similar pattern to previous Russian patrols near Alaska, with aircraft operating in international airspace and comporting to international law and practice.

The real significance of the patrol is in what it demonstrates about growing cooperation between China and Russia and intensifying competition between the United States and those adversaries. The United States should expect continued challenges from China and Russia in the Western Hemisphere to demonstrate that the U.S. homeland is within their reach, as well as further challenges across other domains, including at sea, in space, and across the nuclear dimension. Both the Chinese and Russian bombers involved in the patrol were nuclear capable, a signal that corresponds with the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear forces and persistent Russian nuclear saber-rattling.

Q5: How should the United States respond to future provocations?

A5: Defense Secretary Austin explained in a press briefing on July 25 that the Chinese and Russian aircraft approaching U.S. airspace was “not a surprise,” revealing that U.S. forces had “closely monitored these aircraft, tracked the aircraft, intercepted the aircraft,” with reference to the United States’ “very good surveillance capabilities.” The fact that NORAD was able to track and intercept Chinese and Russian bombers over 200 miles from the U.S. coast illustrates the strength of U.S. early warning and intelligence capabilities and the preparedness of U.S. and allied air forces. By continuing to demonstrate professionalism in these incidents and calling out irresponsible adversary behavior—as Chinese and Russian air and maritime forces frequently demonstrate—the United States can highlight its adversaries’ aggressive behavior for the international community.

U.S. leaders, however, should further improve homeland defenses against a wider range of threats. While NORAD can reliably detect and intercept adversary aircraft, the Chinese balloon incident in early 2023 revealed gaps in the United States’ ability to detect and disrupt other adversary activity in U.S. airspace. Further, the bipartisan U.S. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States observed advances in Chinese and Russian coercive attack weapons that can reach the U.S. homeland. Improvements to U.S. homeland defense radars and accelerating the fielding of integrated air and missile defense capabilities would equip U.S. forces to better defend the U.S. homeland from a variety of potential threats.

The United States should also work to better understand Chinese-Russian cooperation. U.S. intelligence collection and analysis tends to be siloed, with the intelligence community maintaining separate Chinese and Russian intelligence units and experts. As China and Russia work together more closely, there is a growing need to closely examine the bilateral relationship as a whole, including the ways in which the two countries work together and the vulnerabilities in their partnership. This effort will require greater cooperation between Chinese and Russian experts within and across intelligence agencies.

Finally, the United States, its allies, and its partners anchor stability and security across the Indo-Pacific through force posture and presence, exercises and training to build readiness and interoperability, and complementary investments in modern defense capabilities. While China and Russia are attempting to project power together, the United States already does this and must continue.

By: Heather Williams –  director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kari A. Bingen is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. Lachlan MacKenzie is Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS.