China’s Strategic Expansion in Central Asia: Security Ties Strengthened through the Global Security Initiative

China’s Interest in Central Asia

Although China has had decades-long interest in Central Asia, unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 highlighted the limitations of China’s involvement in Central Asian security. Although Beijing offered support to Astana during this period, the Kazakh government could not officially ask for Chinese assistance since there was not an established legal mechanism for it do so.

This situation contrasts with the security relationship that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have with Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has a clear legal basis for Russia to provide security assistance to the Central Asian countries that are CSTO member states.

Thus, Xi’s introduction of the GSI in April 2022 at the Boao Forum should be understood as not only a reflection of Beijing’s desire to act as a guarantor of stability in the world but also as a bid to project greater influence on security in Central Asia. In the future, China could utilize the GSI framework to establish mechanisms or agreements that would provide a legal basis for Beijing to give military or security assistance to Central Asian countries. And since the January 2022 incident, China has begun gradually strengthening its role in security matters in Central Asia.

Why the Global Security Initiative?

China’s desire to influence security in Central Asia is not new. Beijing has long considered Central Asia a zone of vital interests, the security of which directly affects China’s own well-being.

However, the progressive intensification of military and political cooperation between China and Central Asian states in recent years, as well as China’s interest in involving them in the GSI, is influenced by a number of factors:

Belt and Road Initiative. Much of China’s new global approach to security can be traced to the launch of the BRI in 2013. As China pursued growing connectivity with the world beyond its borders, China’s overseas investments rose in volume and scale — and so too did the need to protect those investments.

Central Asia is a key recipient of BRI investments. China’s investment projects in Central Asia over the past 30 years total $64 billion, and direct investment has reached over $15 billion. Ensuring the safety of its assets, capital and citizens abroad is crucial for Beijing, leading to the emergence of private security companies in Central Asian states.

The growth of BRI projects meant that security issues quickly became a regular agenda item in Chinese-Central Asian relations. And in 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for the establishment of cooperation mechanisms at the first summit of foreign ministers for the “China + C5” to ensure security for the BRI.

By involving the regional countries in the GSI, China intends to guarantee the protection of its economic interests in Central Asia, which could contribute to an increase in the number of PSCs and, thus, China’s military presence in the region.

India’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Prior to the GSI, China often defended its interests in Central Asia through the SCO. However, India’s accession to the SCO as a counterbalance to China has undermined Chinese efforts in the security sphere.

Russia’s declining role in the region. In addition to the SCO, China also previously relied on Russia’s military presence in the region. But the war in Ukraine has weakened Moscow — consuming significant resources and diminishing its capabilities. Furthermore, events like Wagner Group leader Prigozhin’s uprising and the Crocus City attack have exposed the vulnerability of Russian security forces in ensuring their own domestic security, let alone their capacity to serve as a reliable guarantor of regional security in Central Asia. Both these developments have prompted Beijing to change its approach to security cooperation with Central Asian countries.

U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, China has placed special emphasis on developing ties with Central Asian states to address the Afghan issue, as China’s Xinjiang region shares a border with Afghanistan and faces a problem of separatism among its ethnic minorities.

Currently, Russia’s ability to resolve Afghan issues is limited, and the Tajik-China border with Afghanistan is vulnerable to the spread of destabilizing forces. Consequently, China is concerned that the Taliban’s incomplete control of Afghanistan and the presence of an ISIS-K-affiliated group in the north of the country could pose security risks.

Socio-political upheaval within Central Asia. The socio-political upheavals within the region — such as the unexpected January crisis in Kazakhstan, the July uprising in the Republic of Karakalpakstan (an autonomous region of Uzbekistan), and armed clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border — have compelled China to reconsider its policy toward Central Asia.

While China previously preferred not to interfere in the internal affairs of the “Central Asian Five,” it now sees it as its duty to protect them from any external destructive influences, focusing on strengthening of its own interaction mechanisms. These events have also served as a warning signal that the level of political risk in Central Asian countries exceeds China’s expectations.

The GSI and Competition with Global Powers

China’s introduction of its global initiatives and strengthened security presence in Central Asia comes at a time where competition among global powers is becoming fiercer. As Kazakh expert Rusland Izimov described in an interview, the region is becoming the object of a “Great Game 2.0,” where the struggle revolves around access to energy resources, critical minerals, technological dominance and security.

One key in this great power competition is the balance of power between Russia and China. According to Kazakhstani political analyst Dosyim Satpayev, maintaining a geopolitical balance of power between Russia and China should be one of the foundations of regional security. Some Russian scholars have therefore argued that China’s attempts to address security issues in Central Asia without Russia’s involvement create an atmosphere of mistrust in the region. In the current circumstances, Beijing and Moscow share tactical rather than strategic goals in Central Asia, as the balance of Russian and Chinese influence in the region gradually shifts in favor of China.

However, the growing geopolitical tensions with Western countries serve as a unifying factor for China and Russia, with the two states agreeing to coordinate defense and security efforts in Central Asia during President Xi’s March 2023 visit to Moscow.

The Risks of Closer Security Ties

There is concern about Central Asia’s increasing closeness to China, with Tajikistani expert Umedjon Ibrokhimzoda asserting that Central Asian countries should remain vigilant, despite China’s apparent commitment to avoiding violating the principle of “balanced equidistance from global centers of power.”

In practice, China is gradually displacing the main players in the Central Asian region and becoming a leader, including in the field of security. Currently, Beijing does not impose its security model on other countries, but its global initiatives could still be a trap for the countries in the region.

As American China expert Robert Daly points out, Central Asian countries may support the GSI, but they may not fully comprehend its consequences. As the GSI gains deeper meaning, it will become increasingly challenging for Central Asian countries to extricate themselves from China’s embrace.

Therefore, it is necessary for Central Asian states to develop an optimal and coherent strategy within the GSI framework to counter China’s persistence in the regional security sphere and define their own role in this process.

The GSI represents a crucial element of China’s foreign policy and security strategy, particularly in light of perceived increasing security threats and risks from both the Eurasian direction — where the war in Ukraine is ongoing with uncertain geopolitical consequences — and the region’s East Asian flank, where the United States is actively pursuing political-military goals against perceived risks to its security from China.

China’s promotion of the GSI, including in Central Asia, is a consistent step toward its long-term goals. Considering that the GSI is likely to become China’s foundational strategy in the medium- and long-term, its implementation could generate geopolitical tensions in the region, particularly if the GSI is perceived as a tool to enhance China’s influence in Central Asia.

This could lead to increased competition with other stakeholders, such as Russia or the United States, and result in diplomatic or economic strains. Ultimately, dependence on Chinese investments and loans could restrict the freedom of decision-making and the independence of Central Asian countries in shaping their foreign policies.

By: Abbos Bobokhonov, Ph.D., – head of the China studies program at the Institute for Advanced International Studies under the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.