In late December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu surprised many by formally recognizing Somaliland—the self-declared breakaway region of Somalia—as an independent state. Somaliland declared independence in 1991 after Somalia’s civil war, and securing international recognition has since been its central diplomatic goal. Israel’s move made it the first country in more than three decades to grant Somaliland formal recognition. The backlash was swift: Somalia’s government condemned the decision as an “unlawful step” and a “deliberate attack” on its sovereignty, while the foreign ministers of Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti issued strong, coordinated denunciations. Criticism soon spread beyond Ankara and the Arab world. China joined a growing list of states rejecting Israel’s decision, alongside African and Middle Eastern governments and regional organizations that reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity and warned the move could further destabilize the Horn of Africa. The African Union also opposed the recognition.
Many observers have framed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as the latest front in a growing rivalry between Turkey and Israel, interpreting the move as a deliberate challenge to Ankara’s influence in the Horn of Africa, where Turkey has deep political, military, and economic ties to Somalia. Yet this reading is ultimately misleading. While Turkey’s sharp reaction reflects its long-standing commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and its broader regional posture, Israel’s decision is better understood not as a Turkey-focused provocation but as part of a wider strategic calculation that extends far beyond bilateral tensions with Ankara: Gaza’s displaced Palestinians.
Gaza Relocation in the Wings
Even before the Somaliland recognition, Israeli and U.S. officials were quietly scouting African territories as potential relocation sites for Gaza’s population. In early 2025 media reports – later confirmed by the Associated Press – noted that Israel had reached out to leaders in Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland about taking in Palestinians from Gaza under a post-war plan promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. (Somalia and Sudan have since denied agreeing to any such deal, but the outreach was real.) By September, Israeli outlets were reporting that Netanyahu and senior ministers were discussing a “voluntary emigration” program: Palestinians choosing to leave Gaza would be flown or shipped to countries willing to receive them. Channel 12 news explicitly mentioned Somaliland among the nations being canvassed, alongside Uganda, South Sudan and Libya. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich publicly acknowledged that Israel was “identifying countries to take in Palestinians” and was even creating a “very large emigration department” within the Defense Ministry to arrange it. Put bluntly, a core Israeli objective in recent months has been finding third-country refuge for Gazans – and Somaliland is high on that list.
This push traces back to Trump’s own Gaza proposals. After Trump’s February 2025 speech floated permanently relocating Gaza’s residents, Netanyahu seized on the idea, calling it a “bold vision”. By spring, Israel’s war cabinet had set up a special directorate to enable Palestinians to “voluntarily” emigrate from Gaza. Hard-liners like Itamar Ben-Gvir urged the project be accelerated – “the mission of the hour,” he said – and Smotrich, though raising logistical concerns, insisted Israel should carry it out. In effect, Israeli planners began treating Trump’s scheme as their own. (Notably, Egypt and most Arab states immediately rejected accepting Gaza refugees, but the Israelis have kept pressing their African contacts.)
Somaliland’s Strategic Allure
Somaliland’s geography reinforces why it would attract Israeli interest. Located on the Gulf of Aden, it commands part of the Horn of Africa’s Red Sea coast near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Both U.S. and Israeli analysts have noted its long coastline and proximity to Yemen as military assets. In particular, Israel sees Somaliland as a backdoor against the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have intermittently attacked Red Sea shipping. Controlling Somaliland’s airspace and ports – especially Berbera, about 250 km south of Houthi-held Yemen – could aid strikes against the Houthis and help secure a key global trade artery. In short, Somaliland strengthens Israel’s Red Sea posture, complementing the Abraham Accords ties it has built with Gulf states. It offers Israel a strategic foothold opposite Yemen at a time when securing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is a priority.
Regional Backlash: Who’s Alarmed, and Why
Predictably, neighboring governments zeroed in on these implications. Turkey’s government was furious: Ankara’s foreign ministry denounced the recognition as an “unlawful intervention” in Somalia, accusing Netanyahu’s cabinet of “expansionist policies” aimed at destabilizing the region. But Turkey’s main worry is its long-term alliance with Somalia, not merely bilateral tensions with Israel. In fact, Turkish anger – framed as safeguarding Somali unity – aligned with how others saw the move: as endangering Palestinians.
Egypt took an even more direct stance on Gaza. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty convened phone calls with the foreign ministers of Somalia, Turkey and Djibouti to “categorically reject and condemn” Israel’s recognition, explicitly reaffirming support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and rejecting “any plans to displace the Palestinian people outside their land”. Somalia’s authorities echoed those concerns: Somalia’s state minister for foreign affairs told Al Jazeera that Israel’s Somaliland recognition was driven in large part by a goal “to further displace Palestinians from Gaza,” calling the relocation plan a well-known Israeli objective. Even Palestine’s foreign ministry weighed in, recalling that Israel had once identified Somaliland as a potential destination for forcibly moving Palestinians – a move they declared an absolute “red line”. The African Union similarly objected, with its chairperson insisting Somaliland “remains an integral part of Somalia” and warning against upending African borders. Notice: none of these statements treats Turkey as the issue. They focus on Gaza and Somali sovereignty.
By contrast, Israel’s public messaging emphasized partnership. Netanyahu released a celebratory photo of himself video-calling Somaliland’s president, calling the move “historic” and highlighting joint plans for economic, agricultural and technological cooperation “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords”. But that upbeat framing belies what senior Israeli figures admit privately: by recognizing Somaliland unilaterally, Israel has effectively weakened its own precedent against Palestinian statehood. Every country except Israel still treats Somaliland as part of Somalia – so recognizing it solo even undercuts Jerusalem’s stance on Palestinian claims. That underscores the logic: Israel was willing to contradict international norms about Somaliland only because it sees a larger objective at stake.
Gaza’s Future, Not Turkish Politics
In the end, Israel’s Somaliland gambit fits squarely into its Gaza strategy rather than Turkey policy. Senior Israeli politicians have signaled repeatedly that they intend Gaza to be depopulated in some form. In this context, Somaliland became the surprising but logical target for Israel’s attention. By offering Somaliland de facto legitimacy, Israel may gain both a willing host and a strategic ally – and thus accelerate its population-transfer agenda. Spinning the recognition as an anti-Ankara provocation misses the forest for the trees. All evidence, from Israeli media reports and Trump-administration contacts to statements by Israel’s own ministers, points to Gaza relocation as the motivator.
This is a deeply controversial path. Human-rights advocates in Somaliland have warned that hosting Palestinian refugees “could render Somaliland complicit in the genocide” unfolding in Gaza. Palestinians and Arab states uniformly reject any transfer plan, insisting Gazans’ rightful place is in Palestine. If an Israeli-Somaliland arrangement were ever implemented – setting up camps or corridors for Gaza’s people – it would ignite fierce resistance and further isolate Israel internationally. For now, both Somalia and Somaliland publicly deny any formal resettlement agreement, and even U.S. backers like Trump have stepped back from endorsing the idea.
Nevertheless, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was not a random gesture. In practice, it unlocks tangible possibilities: a legal framework for aid, military coordination, and the hope (in Israel’s eyes) of a partner willing to absorb Palestinians.
In short: by the evidence, this initiative is less about snubbing Ankara and more about preparing for Gaza’s future. As one Western diplomat noted, Israel appears to be “trying to export” Gaza’s population problem to willing third countries – and Somaliland just became one such country in its sights.
Any analysis that dismisses the Somaliland move as a mere Turkey provocation overlooks these dynamics. The timing, the actors involved, and the content of official Israeli and Somali statements all point to Gaza. While Erdogan will no doubt use this recognition as a club in his rhetorical battles with Jerusalem, the real story lies elsewhere: Israel is looking to secure Gaza’s emptiness, and in that calculation Somaliland plays a key role. That is the context in which this historic-sounding decision must be understood – not as another geo-political tit-for-tat with Ankara, but as a step toward implementing Israel’s vision for Gaza’s population.
