Summary by Geopolist | Istanbul Center for Geopolitics:
Stephen Walt frames the Trump administration’s handling of U.S. allies—especially NATO—through the familiar “good cop/bad cop” interrogation analogy. In his telling, Washington’s overall posture has become more predatory and coercive, using threats, economic pressure, and deliberate political provocation to extract concessions from partners that the United States has traditionally described as friends. The “bad cop” side of the act, as he describes it, is performed by figures who deliver the harshest messages and create maximum anxiety: sharp public rebukes, tariff threats and trade escalation, insinuations that alliance commitments are conditional, and rhetoric that treats long-standing allies with visible contempt. This approach, he argues, is designed to keep European governments unsettled and reactive—never fully sure what the United States will do next, and therefore more likely to pay a price to reduce uncertainty.
Against that backdrop, Walt says a second group plays the “good cop” role. These officials offer a more polished and conciliatory tone, emphasize civilizational or strategic partnership, and present themselves as responsible stewards who want to stabilize the relationship. But the point, Walt argues, is not to reverse the underlying pressure campaign. Rather, the “good cops” help convert fear and confusion into compliance by encouraging Europeans to believe that accommodation and flattery can restore normal ties, or at least buy time until political conditions change in Washington. Even when they avoid openly contradicting the “bad cops,” they still signal that the path back to calmer relations runs through Europeans doing more of what the U.S. demands—more spending, more alignment, fewer red lines, and fewer attempts to resist.
Walt is careful to say he cannot prove this is a centrally coordinated strategy, but he thinks it looks that way in practice and aligns with Donald Trump’s long-standing belief that unpredictability is a bargaining weapon. The pattern also serves a larger objective he attributes to Trump: preferring to negotiate with European countries individually, where U.S. power is maximized and coalition discipline is weakest. From this perspective, a cohesive European Union is an obstacle, while political currents that fragment Europe or weaken EU institutions make it easier for Washington to play capitals against one another. Walt argues that this logic helps explain why the administration is comfortable intervening rhetorically in European politics in ways that empower forces hostile to the EU; it is not only ideological affinity, in his view, but also the practical advantage of dealing with a more divided continent.
The warning running through his piece is that this may feel like leverage in the short term, but it could damage U.S. interests in the long term. A weaker, more internally divided Europe is not automatically a win for Washington in a world of major-power competition; it can become a less reliable strategic partner, less willing to coordinate on intelligence or technology controls, and more motivated to diversify economic ties and security relationships away from the United States. He also suggests that sustained pressure from both the United States and Russia could, paradoxically, push Europe to overcome collective-action problems and move further toward genuine strategic autonomy—maybe even, in an extreme scenario, deeper political unity. In other words, the same bullying intended to keep Europe dependent could end up accelerating the very independence it seeks to prevent.
Walt concludes that Europeans should not be mystified by the mixed signals because mixed signals are the point. “Good cop” reassurances should not be taken at face value as evidence that the underlying direction has changed; the real test is behavior—trade policy choices, alliance commitments, and whether Washington treats agreements as durable or as opening bids to be revised whenever it wants more. If Europe wants to stop the downward slide in transatlantic relations, he argues, it cannot rely on soothing rhetoric or private assurances. The only effective counter, in his view, is to present a united front and judge the United States by actions rather than words.
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